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Oil and Gas Leasing in Montana: An In-depth
Look at the Process. (130 pages)
Director: Dennis J. O'Donnell V(JO
The State of Montana holds quarterly auctions for the rights to drill for
oil and gas on state land. During the decade that this study encompasses
the revenue from these auctions has risen from just over sixty thousand
dollars in first quarter 1971 to a high of over fifteen million dollars in
second quarter 1980. If the stream of revenues is to be maximized over
time, it becomes important to forecast the future revenue from these
auctions, given assumptions about certain economic and physical trends.
Using a market approach to distribute leases has three functional
characteristics; the generation of revenues, the allocation of a scarce
resource, and the provision of information for future decision making. This
last function makes it unnecessary for the state to do extensive geological
evaluation to determine the value of tracts, provided a fa ir auction process
is used, awarding no leases in auctions with less than four bidders.
Several methods of regression analysis are used to analyze the data on
successful lease bids.
The announcement of large OPEC price hikes
triggered increases in lease prices before the price hike actually occured.
The effect of these influential observations is reduced using a linear
regression technique that is not as responsive to outliers as ordinary least
squares.
The equation developed include varibles for the price of oil, interest rates,
state and national oil production and current oil field activity. This equation,
given certain assumptions about the future, is then used to forecast
revenue, and thus aid in long term planning.
One of the striking results of this analysis is that the government need
not engage in gathering information about specific tracts.
The only
information that the government needs is of an economic nature, which is
then used to plan the location and timing of future sales in a fashion
designed to maximize the present value of the stream of revenues.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The rapid increases in the price of oil over the last decade has lead to sig
nificant changes in the world economy.

The structure of the oil industry has also

been changing radically over that time, as well as the patterns of national and in
ternational trade and political power. These changes have been felt by consumers
as well as producers of oil and related goods and services.

The owner of the

rights to petroleum or coal deposits has seen them grow in value three or four
times. The implications of this to a state such as Montana are varied. The State of
Montana owns a large number of tracts of land scattered across the
Thousands of those acres are over potential oil producing deposits.

state.

Montana has

seen the value of some oil leases increase greatly since the price of oil started to
rise in 1972 and since the state leases out the rights to drill and extract oil on
State lands, there needs to be some discussion both of the mechanism and the
results of the process which allocates those leases.
Once every quarter the Montana Department of State Lands holds an auction
to sell leases which confer both the right to explore for oil and gas, and extract it
from land that belongs to the state.

In general, the lessee is given the exclusive

right to explore for, to drill for, to develop, to produce, and to remove and market
his share of the production from a lease tract.

In rare cases, exploratory leases

are let, which restrict the lessee to just exploration. The attraction of these leases

1

is that they tend to be considerably less expensive than full exploration and
development leases.

However, there is a risk that when the lessee goes to re

negotiate for development and production rights, the lessor will demand an ex
orbitant fee.
The State Lands auctions involve oral bids in which the bidding variable is a
cash payment, or "bonus", which must be paid to the government before the
lessee's rights may be exercised, i.e. before any exploration or development may
begin.

These leases extend for a period of ten years or as long as the tract is

producing either oil or natural gas.

Payments to the State include the original bid

price or "bonus payment", a royalty of 13 percent on the value of the crude oil
pumped per year, 12 1/2% on all gas produced, and an annual rental of $1.50 per
acre.

These leases often sell for the minimum bid, which in many cases is $1.50

per acre.
The Department of State Lands is charged with administering the lands under
its control in order to maximize "...the advantage to the state".

For the purposes of

this paper it will be assumed that this mandate includes the maximization of
revenue from lands leased for oil and gas exploration and development.

To max

imize revenue can be taken as meaning the maximization of revenue across time,
that is, the maximization of the present value of current and future sales from
state lands.

At a macro level, the more oil produced now, the less can be

produced in the future.

If the price of the particular resource is expected to

remain constant or decline over time, the producer will prefer to sell the maximum
amount in the earliest time period and thus be able to invest the proceeds else

where.

If the real price is expected to go up at the same rate as the interest rate,

the producer will be indifferent to production now as compared to production in
later time periods.
The decision to drill in a particular area is, in reality, a two part process.

The

first step is deciding to gather information on a particular tract or area, and the
second is then deciding to drill in a particular location and applying to The Depart
ment to make that tract available for leasing.

For the sake of simplicity, both of

these steps can be considered as one. The individual tracts are made available for
lease by applying to the Department of State Lands.

The Department then

publishes a list of tracts to be sold at the next auction in The Montana Oil Journal.
In this process, the state does not have any real control over the timing of oil and
gas development on state lands.
As figure 1-1 shows, there has been considerable variation In the amount of
land sold in each quarter over the study period 1971-1961J

The quantity of land

that is available for lease seems to be very responsive to the desire to drill.

If this

is true, then a change In the quantity of land demanded for leasing will result In a
supply quantity response that will offset to a great degree, the price response that
would normally occur.

The Implication Is that supply may be a demand response.

If this is the case, then any attempt to maximize long run returns (or net present
benefit) Is bound to fall; because no amount of planning can influence the actual
timing of the leases.

^This data is from The M ontana D epartm ent of S tate lands w hich w as kind enough to supply the
M ontana lease data for this study.
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There are three primary objectives to this paper: a brief exploration of the
literature, an econometric analysis of current behavior, and a discussion of the
policy implications and alternatives.

In discussing the current behavior, I will not

be attempting to model the process a bidder goes through when deciding to bid
on a tract or how much to bid, but rather to identify major influences and use
them to project the revenue to the state from the sale of leases.

The major issue

to be considered is how the state allocates the scarce resource of oil and gas
leases.

A closely related issue is the criteria to be used in making the choices of

how resources are allocated.

Chapter 2
The Petroleum Market

The demand for oil and gas leases is a derived demand, derived from the
demand for crude oil, which in turn is derived from the demand for petroleum
products.

The

major demands for petroleum

are transportation; to

produce

gasoline, diesel, or aviation fuels, or as a feedstock for the petrochemical industry;
used to produce fertilizers, pesticides, and plastics.

Oil leases are purchased by

both integrated oil companies as well as companies interested in marketing either
crude oil, or producing wells.

"Many companies have found It to be much cheaper

to buy producing properties than to try to explore for and develop their own" [20,P.
9].
It is important to examine the influence the market for crude oil has on the
market for oil and gas leases within Montana.

For this reason, the analysis of oil

and gas leasing is concerned in part with the price of crude oil.

The wellhead

price of crude is an important determinant of the lease price, which is evidenced
by a strong correlation between oil prices and lease prices.^ The wellhead price is
affected by a number of factors:

quality, costs of transportation and refining, and

demand and supply conditions to name a few.

There are two aspects of crude oil

correlation of 0.708 was calculated using the data from The M ontana D ep a rtm en t of S ta te Lands
and the U.S. price fo r new oil over the study period 1 9 7 1 -1 9 8 1 .

quality which influence its price: the distillate content and the sulphur content.
Light crude oils command higher prices than heavier crudes, both because of their
higher distillate content and they invariably have a low sulphur content.

The sul

phur content is important for several reasons; the main ones are lower refining
costs, due to the need for less desulfurization, as well as environmental con
straints, which may restrict or even prohibit the use of high sulphur fuels.

The

wellhead price of crude also varies with the location of the well or collection te r
minal reflecting transportation costs to major markets.
An other influence on the price of oil and gas leases is the cost of bringing
the oil to market

If we assume that exploration, development, and marketing of

crude oil (within the United States) is a competitive industry,^ then it is safe to say
that producers (within the United States) can not influence the price of crude that
they sell to refineries,

in 1976, the eight major oil companies had only an es

timated 40 percent of the total U.S. domestic oil production, while the number of
oil and gas operators in the petroleum industry numbered over 16,000 [20,P. 267].
Competition in the market for an exhaustible resource is characterized by a great
number of producers.

Each producer can independently decide how much of the

resource he will "produce" during each time period. Because the average producer
can have no impact on the price, they want to minimize the cost of producing and
transporting it to market.

^Ramsey (1980) notes, "The conclusion from th(e) evidence w as th a t the oil industry Is at le a s t as
com petitive as United States m anufacturing is on average" [35,P. 153] and "On the dem and side (of
the lease market), one m ay usefully assum e a com petitive market." and this, he goes on to say "...leads
to the form ulation o f a stochastic dem and curve . w h e re the expected value o f m arket d em an d is the
fam iliar quantity dem an d ed /p rice relationship" [35,P. 153] (Emphasis added).
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There are a number of forces which act on the cost of drilling an oil well,
which is a factor in defining the oil lease market.

The first is a change in the

prices of goods and services purchased by the drilling company or operator.

This

affects all wells in proportion to the amount of those goods and services that are
used in drilling them.
directly.

The depth of a well influence its cost both directly and in

Directly, in that, more powerful drilling rigs, and stronger drilling pipe are

required for deep wells; the deeper the well, the longer the time it takes to replace
the drill bit and so forth.

Indirectly, because there is no reason to suppose that

changes in prices will affect different depth wells proportionally.
of price increases may not be, and probably are not, depth neutral.

Thus the effects
In addition, the

effects of technological change will act to reduce the per well cost, but again the
effects may not be clear. The reduction in cost may not be proportional from one
well to another. The cost of an exploratory well is a function of the drilling depth,
the success ratio, the average size of discovery per successful wildcat, and the
number of wildcats drilled. Because there is no real apriori knowledge of location,
depth, or size when drilling an exploratory well, the firm uses geological data to
try and approximate that information.
One of the greatest influences on per unit cost, once the well has been
drilled, is its productivity.

The large onshore wells in the Middle East are some of

the most productive in the world.

They may flow at a rate of 10,000 barrels per

day or more, and produce oil at a cost of about 10 cents per barrel.

More

moderate wells in areas such as Nigeria may produce 2,000 barrels per day at a
cost of around 50 cents per barrel.

Small wells, such as those in most parts of

the United States have production quantities in the area of 20 to 100 barrels per
day and may have to be pumped.
barrel.

The cost from these wells may be $1.00 per

Production from more exotic wells, such as those on the North Slope or

from typical offshore oil wells may also cost around $1.00 per barrel, and produc
tion from such unfavorable areas as the North Sea may cost $5.00 per barrel or
more [23,P. 501.
In that the oil and gas under state lands is a non-renewable resource, the
sale of leases to drill for oil and gas is also a non-renewable resource.

If the bid

der either defaults on the bonus payment, or fails to drill within the required
amount of time, the lease may be sold again.

However, once the purchaser (or his

agent) has drilled, either successfully or unsuccessfully, that particular tract is no
longer available to the State for resale.

If the State was better able to make

projections about future revenues, it would then be able to allocate the sale of
tracts across time, additionally it might set a minimum price that better reflected
the "cost" of selling a tract in the present as compared to selling it sometime in
the future.

Another option is to in someway alter the bidding process so that

Montana captures a larger portion of the profits associated with oil production on
state lands.

Chapter 3
The Theory of Auctions

There are three main roles for a market approach, i.e. the use of an auction
process, in the distribution of oil and gas leases.

They are the generation of

revenues for the seller, the allocation of a scarce resource, and the provision of
information for future decisionmaking.
the most important.

In most cases, this last role is considered

The oil and gas industry is inherently an uncertain one.

The

auction process, when correctly functioning, generates relative prices for different
areas, which reduce to some extent the uncertainty about their relative values.
The government learns which areas should be given priority in future leasing and
bidders learn from their success or failure how they should bid in the future.

It is

a process that reduces uncertainty over time by generating a stream of prices that
are available to everyone.
It should be noted that oil and gas lease tracts are an example of either
single items or multiple offerings of heterogeneous items.

This is because, with

some exceptions, tracts are neither homogeneous in size nor quality.

In this con

text, the word quality generally refers to the likelihood of discovering oil or gas of
a quantity and at a depth that would make the development of that tract profitable.
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3.1. Bidding
When examining the auction process, it is useful to consider the differences
between the two major bidding methods used.

In much of the literature, the dis

tinction among bidding procedures is between oral and sealed bids. This is a dis
tinction by method, but not by effects, and as such is not very useful theoretically.
A more valuable way to examine bidding procedures is to categorize them as ei
ther "competitive" ("standard", or "non-discriminatory"), or "discriminatory".
With competitive bidding, the highest bid wins "...but pays an amount equal
to the second highest bid" [35,p. 66] and with discriminatory bidding the highest
bidder also wins, but the winner pays the amount of his winning bid.

Usually,

sealed bidding is done is a discriminatory manner; and oral bidding, in the United
States and Great Britain, is done in a competitive m anner

However, it is possible

for sealed bids to be carried out is a competitive manner and for oral auctions to
be discriminatory.
It is important to consider the effects that the different bidding methods can
have on the outcome of an auction.

Vernon Smith (1967) has shown, for the

simple models he examined, assuming each bidder maximizes the expected utility
of the outcome of his actions, "...the effective demand curve under the dis
criminatory auction bidding procedure lay everywhere below the market demand
curve..." [35,p. 67].

W. Vickery (1961), assuming profit maximizing behavior and a

certain distribution of the value to each bidder of the item being auctioned, con
cluded that the expected price to the seller was the same under both methods.
From these and other studies, it has become clear that as the number of
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bidders increases the maximum bid price also increases.

However, with a se

quence of auctions, this result changes somewhat as the bidders learn from pre
vious auctions.

Winning bidders learn that in a discriminatory auction they can

continue to win with lower bids and losers learn to raise their bids.

However,

"...changes in the amount supplied from period to period, or changes in the quality
or nature of the object of bidding slow the learning process" [35,p. 68].

Smith

(1967) found in repeated experiments where market demand and supply conditions
were unknown to the bidders, bidding converged quickly to the experimentally
determined

market price, even though

each bidder knew only

cumstances and the current bid/offer amount.

his own

cir

Wilson (1977) has shown that the

maximum bid converges almost surely to the value of the item being auctioned.
However, bidders were still assumed to be risk neutral and the bidding process
discriminatory.

3.2. Rent
Low cost oil producing areas extract "rent" as the price of oil increases.
"Economic rent is defined as the amount by which the price of a good or service
could be reduced without motivating its owner to alter the use and employment of
the resource" (5,p. 560].

This use of the word "rent" should not be confused with

that normally associated with the price of using an apartment or car owned by
someone else. Changes in the economy which in some manner either increase the
demand for oil, or interrupt supply may lead to price increases that generate "rent"
to the owners of the leases (wells).

Rent can be thought of as the difference be
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tween the value received by producers (reflecting the consumers willingness to
pay) and the transfer price,^ alternatively, "economic rent can be defined as the
difference between market price and opportunity cost" [5,p. 563].
is the value of the resource in its next most profitable use.

Opportunity cost

Payments above the

opportunity cost (transfer price ) are unnecessary for allocating the resource to a
particular use.
Rent in the economic sense must also be distinguished from "quasi-rent".
"The payment to any input in temporarily short supply is called a quasi-rent" [26,p.
370].

In the short-run it may seem that a company is making excess profit (or

rent) on the production from a particularly rich field, but the company in all prob
ability has drilled a number of "dry holes" in its search for oil.

Normal profit must

be large enough to cover the expenses of these dry holes as well as induce the
company (or industry) to continue exploration. These short run surplus' which ap
pears to be excessive profit or "rent" may be only normal profit or "quasi-rent"
when viewed in the long-run.

Real rent therefore is those same excess profits,

when they continue into the long-run.

For example, in fields which were drilled

when the price of a barrel of oil was around two dollars per barrel, in the absence
of regulation, there is enormous rent accruing to the owners of those wells now
that oil sells for around thirty dollars per barrel.
Economic rent is an attractive target for taxation because the tax burden,
"cannot be shifted onto others and consequently produces no distortions or excess

*T h e tran s fe r price is considered the price at which a producer is in d iffe re n t to allo catin g resources
to one use or the next best alternative.

14

burden" [5,p. 563].

The oil

severance

tax

and

windfall

profits taxes

on

oil

producers are several ways society has for capturing some portion of the rent as
sociated with the sudden upswing in the price of oil in the last decade.

3.3. Risk
The quality of a lease tract can be considered as a combination of the
likelihood that there is any oil at all to be found in a particular tract, the quantity
of oil to be found, the quality of that oil (BTU and sulfur content), and the depth of
the oil.

All these factors influence the risk of drilling a productive well.

The

higher the risk, the lower the potential future profits from a particular lease tract,
and the lower the winning bid is apt to be.

Ramsey has concluded that "an in

crease in risk for a given assumed value of the lease will lower the optimal bid
price under both discriminatory and competitive bidding methods" [35,p. 81].
One of the levels of distinction which is often made in the theory, which is
now practically irrelevant in real world

analysis, is between

risk, where the

probablities of random occurences are assumed to be known, and uncertainty,
where those probabilities are assumed to be unknown.

In reality, the probabilities

of random occurences are very seldom known, except for games, such as poker or
roulette.

The decision maker, usually, has some idea of the probability function

and uses that uncertain information, along with any other data, to estimate the
parameters
probabilities.

of the

probability distribution

and

thus

derive

estimates

of the

This differs from the classical risk situation in that the decision

maker can learn and thus acquire additional information about the problem or
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process.

No decision making is carried out in pure uncertainty, since the only

recommendation that could be made is that all unknown events are equally likely.
Not a very useful form of analysis.

A further complication is that the underlying

probability functions often change from one situation to another, and sometimes
from one time period to the next, thus making the learning process more difficult.
Each random process is composed of two components, the stochastic com 
ponent (or variation) and the deterministic component.

The stochastic component

may be thought of as the effect produced by factors outside the bidder's control,
and the deterministic competent as the direct result of the bidder's actions and
decisions.

In oil well drilling, the variation in the stochastic component is much

larger relative to the deterministic component.
Compare the oil exploration process to the manufacture of high quality
watches, where the stochastic variation is (presumably) quite small when com
pared to the deterministic component.

It is this deterministic component that

manufacturers are trying to contain with product inspections and quality control.
There is no effective way for the entrepreneur to control for the stochastic varia
tion that makes oil and gas drilling such a risky business.
There are two main sources of risk facing potential bidders for oil and gas
leases, inherent causes and ignorance.

Inherent causes of risk are derived from

the physical or economic environment the economic agent (bidder) is operating in.
Prices change due to unexplainable shifts in demand, machines that break down
randomly and men who fail to show up at work are all examples of inherent risk.
Both social and physical activities can

be thought

of as inherently

random
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processes.
The second main source of risk is ignorance.

Ignorance in this context

means lack of knowledge on the part of the decision maker.

For example, the fu

ture price of oil can play an important part in deciding on the price to pay for oil
leases.

One can be uncertain of the future price of oil, because prices are

stochastic, but one can be equally uncertain even if prices are not stochastic.

If

the OPEC oil ministers are meeting to set the marker price of crude, the bidder is
then uncertain about the future price, because he does not know what they will
decide. If the uncertainly is due to ignorance, the bidder may be able to eliminate
or at least reduce the the risk by obtaining new or better information. The uncer
tainty of future demand will affect the price of leases as oil firms attempt to main
tain an inventory of exploration prospects.

Demand in the future may be larger or

smaller than it is presently and it has a variance that increases as the time horizon
does.

However, uncertainty will not directly affect the price of a lease.

Pindyck

notes that "...demand uncertainty has no effects on the expected behavior of
price" [33,p. 124].
In most real world situations, both of these types of risk occur to some ex
tent.

Most commonly the "...situation is one in which an economic agent must

make a decision where the outcome depends on the value of a random variable
and the parameters of that variable's distribution are not known" [19,p. 12].
A decision maker can make investments in three broad risk categories: (1)
investments with very little risk about the expected return; (2) investments with a
moderate degree of risk, but with neither the expectation of a large loss or a large
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gain; and (3) those investments with a great deal of risk and the possibility of
large losses or large gains.

Generally, decision makers can be grouped into either

the first category or the third.

"[P]eople must in general be paid a premium to in

duce them to undertake moderate risks Instead of subjecting themselves to either
small or large risks" [18,p. 284].

We can consider the first group to be risk averse

decision makers, and the second to be risk-takers.

"The majority of firms in the

[oil] industry exhibit significant aversion to risk, but the degree of risk aversion
decreases among larger firms '. [39,p. 267]
In the discussion of risk, it must be remembered that the level of response
to risk are not the same as the level of risk itself. This becomes clearer when you
consider that a risk adverse person has a much stronger negative response to the
same level of risk, than someone who is either risk neutral or a risk taker.
For risk adverse decision makers, the presence of risk in a project imposes a
certain cost.

Risk can be viewed as a cost in that the decision maker could ach

ieve a higher level of utility if there was no risk in the situation.

Thus, the deci

sion maker faces a choice among several alternatives: bearing the full risk himself,
engaging in market transactions to exchange the risk for some commodity, or en
gaging in various activities to try to reduce the risk.

The sale of stocks is a well

documented form of risk transfer within the marketplace.

The greater the amount

of equity stock owned outside the firm, the greater the amount of risk the firm has
distributed.

Examples of the market transfer of risk are joint ventures, hedging, fu

tures trading and of course insurance.

There are two fundamental approaches for

dealing with risk: benefit maximization, that is maximizing the benefits if everything
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goes right, or loss minimization, minimizing the losses if everything goes wrong.
If on average investors are risk averse, "properly functioning markets should
confer higher profits on higher-risk firms and industries." [2,p. 304]

This may ex

plain the number of bids from small firms which are traditionally considered more
risk averse, than larger firms. "[T]he premium required to induce a firms to accept
such risks is inversely related to the size of the firm." [39,p. 252]

One of the ways

for firms to reduce the risk of investments is with a diversified portfolio, either by
bidding on a number of small projects, or by the use of joint bidding, which
spreads the potential losses over a consortium of firms.
If the risk is inherent in the physical situation, the decision maker may be
able to alter the situation in such a fashion as to decrease the risk.

The use of

mine supports to prevent cave-ins and the use of quality control in manufacturing
to reduce defects and the consequent product returns are both examples of reduc
ing risk by changing the physical source of the risk.

Insurance companies recog

nize this and often insist on changes in plant design or operation as a condition
for coverage.

If the source of the uncertainty is ignorance, then the acquisition of

information can reduce that risk, as in the use of geological data to determine
locations for wildcat drilling.
It is this last response to risk which explains the use of an auction instead of
setting the price of a drilling lease on a particular tract.

The question of why the

owner of a resource will sell it at auction and not by setting a price. Is answered
in one word, ignorance.

In this situation, the owner does not know the market

price of the "item" up for sale and the cost of acquiring that information may be
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quite large.
risk.

The use of the auction is a method by which the seller reduces his

There are essentially three alternatives to the seller who does not know the

relevant demand curve he faces: he can acquire costly information about demand,
he can set a price and bear the "waiting cost" until the good is sold, he can set a
quantity and bear the cost of an uncertain price.

There are substantial costs in

determining the market value of an oil/gas tract, and while it is also true that there
are costs of carrying out an auction, these costs probably will in no way approach
those of acquiring the necessary market information to sell an oil and gas lease.
The distinction between an auction and just setting a price is that in the
former the seller sets the quantity to be sold and is uncertain about the price at
which the market will clear, and in the latter the seller sets the price and is uncer
tain about the quantity at which the market will clear. If there were was no uncer
tainty about the demand function, then the seller could choose to either quote a
price and sell the desired quantity, or offer a quantity and accept those price offers
at known demand prices. In either case, the result would be the same.
It is for these reasons that the auction process is superior to setting fixed
prices,

when the market price of a commodity is unknown, and an auction is a

less costly way of reducing risk due to ignorance than acquiring information or
waiting time costs, economic theory suggests that it should be used.
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3.4. The Auction Market
While these lease auctions often involve a "large" number of people, from
which some might infer a competitive process, oral bidding tends to understate
the maximum value that bidders are willing to pay.
take the form of sealed bid auctions.

Many similar auctions now

In this situation, there is no (or certainly

much less) possibility of interaction among the bidders.

"[Tjheory predicts that

collusive conduct is more likely to occur when... the number of firms in an industry
is small". [17,p. 211. This is because as the industry becomes larger it is both har
der to coordinate the actions of the firms and because cost and demand con
ditions will vary among the firms which tends to reduce the incentive for collusion.
A sealed bid auction would reduce the possiblity of collusion since the ability to
explicitly collude beforehand would be significantly reduced by the sheer numbers
involved.

If a bidder wants to drill on a particular tract, there is no effective way

for him to find out what the other potential participants are willing to pay for that
tract.

In this case, the only effective strategy is to bid the maximum amount the

lease is worth, taking into account the risk of a dry hole, the anticipated costs of
the project, and the potential for changes in the price of oil over the lifetime of
the project.
The number of bidders also plays an important part in the results of the auc
tion using either the discriminatory or competitive bidding scheme.

Given the as

sumptions that each bidder has market information about the conditions that he
faces, but no information about specific competitors, and that the bidder does not
know

how

many

competitors

he

has,

Ramsey

concludes

"...the

maximum
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expected...bid increases with...the number of bidders, despite the fact that each in
dividual bidder lowers his optimal bid" [35,p. 94].

He also assumes that there is a

single seller of a single good, (e.g. the State of Montana selling oil leases), that
each bidder has the same access to information and that bidder react to the ag
gregate behavior of their competitors, not to individual ones.
Probably the most important question to be asked in this section is which of
the two bidding procedures, discriminatory or competitive, yields the largest ex
pected return to the producer.

The answer is not a simple one since the results

are affected by the number of bidders, their risk aversion, and their wealth.

In

general, one can say that discriminatory bidding will yield the greater return for
small numbers of low risk averse, large-wealth bidders, and the competitive bid
ding procedure will yield the greater return for large numbers of low wealth, highly
risk averse bidders. When we speak of "small numbers" of bidders, ten is generally
considered the cutoff point [35,p. 96].
is Montana auctions.

This is a number that is generally exceeded

As to the question of whether the bidders are risk adverse

or not and whether they are wealthly requires additional research.

3.5. The Long Term
There are three elements of the marginal, or incremental cost of oil left in
the ground.
discount.

They are the expected revenue, the discount rate, and the period of

The discount rate and the period of discount are tied together, because

at any given discount rate there is a time period, beyond which any reasonable
sum is discounted to a very small number or for the sake of analysis effectively to
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zero.

The lower the discount rate, the more activity is moved into the future.

If

one assumes an interest rate and price structure of future increases such that a
barrel of crude oil ten years from now is worth (in discounted dollars) the same as
a barrel of current production (ceteris

paribus), the decision to produce now or ten

years hence is not a question that economics is capable of answering.
from being a question of efficiency to one

of allocation.

It goes

It does not seem

legitimate to consider the opportunity cost of capital as the social discount rate
(or social time preference), when "licensing" the production of an exhaustible
resource. They are the same only under conditions of perfect capital markets, and
a common perception of the future.

That is, should that oil be used now, or

should it be "allocated" to the future.

A question that is beyond the scope of this

paper.
Given the long-term nature of oil and gas development, the bidder has an
enormous incentive to forecast the price of energy as accurately as possible.

If

future energy prices are overestimated, the firm will invest too much and realize a
lower rate of return than if it had invested elsewhere.

If, on the other hand, future

energy prices are underestimated the firm will invest too little and end up forego
ing profits.

It is equally true that the state has the same incentive.

The more ac

curate the state's forecast, the greater the likelihood that the leases can be
properly allocated across time, and thus maximize present net value.
According to the theory, the price of oil leases Is a function of a large num
ber of economic variables, and therefore does not vary perfectly with the price of
crude oil.

Interest rates for investment capital, the amount of low cost crude be

23

ing imported, the number of rotary rigs available for drilling, changes in U.S. oil
production, and probably most important the location of the lease, all affect its
selling price.
what happens?

If the price of crude rises and the new price is expected to persist,
The number of wildcats drilled will be higher than if the old price

had been maintained, and areas that were considered attractive under the old price
will be come even more attractive, and areas that were only marginally attractive
under the old price will now be considered worth drilling.

These areas are mar

ginal because of the perception that they are poorer prospects.

If this perception

is approximately correct, it follows in aggregate, that either the success rate will
be lower, the drilling depth deeper, or the average find smaller.

All of these are

elements of total cost, and any one of these will serve to raise the average cost
per barrel found, thus behaving in an offsetting manner.

While the price is up,

there is a strong incentive to drill poorer prospects, but the higher per barrel cost
of these prospects acts in the opposite direction. It is also true that if the price of
oil falls instead of rises, the reverse will occur as marginal tracts are cut from the
list of drilling prospects.

3.6. Bidding Alternatives
In the leasing of state lands, the goal of government can be defined as the
maximization of net present benefit from the bonus payments, and the royalty pay
ments.

This requires that the planning horizon be long enough for all present oil

reserves to be utilized.

It is, however, impossible to make realistic long-run

projections of supply and demand conditions. Additionally, the consequences of an
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extended tim e period and the discount rate diminishes the effect of these distant
changes to insignificance.

The present value of net oil revenue from the sale of

oil and gas during the relevant time period is given by:
T
PNV- I 1/(1+r)'*(P,-C,)0,
t=1
where T is the planning horizon, P^-C^ is the net revenue per barrel in year t,
and r is the discount rate and

is the production in year t.

an important factor in the calculation of present new value.

The interest rate is
The higher the inter

est rate (or discount rate) the lower present net value is. The use of a simple dis
count approach to calculate net present value, or the internal rate of return can be
used as a policy tool to determine the best timing of the sale of leases on State
lands, given a particular view of the future.
From a broader, i.e. national, perspective, things do not have quite the same
appearance.

In 1980, imports of petroleum constituted over 40 percent of U.S.

supply, and at then current price levels, it meant that we were spending over $90
billion annually for oil [35,p. xvi].

The amount of dollars that were being exported

every week had a profound effect on the American economy.

There are a number

of possible remedies; encourage conservation, develop alternative energy sources
and/or increase domestic production of oil and gas.

This last policy option may

conflict with the desires of the various states to draw out the production of oil
and gas over time, in order to better utilize the resource.
Once the timing of the oil and gas development on state lands is determined,
there are a number of bidding variables that can be used to allocate the oil and
gas leases.

They can be used as alternatives to one another or in combination.
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TABLE 3 -1 :
COMPETITVE LEASE BIDDING MODELS AND OBJECT OF BIDDING
011 and Gas leases. Federal and Active State Governments
Bidding Method
Oral Auction
Sealed Bid

Object of Bidding
Bonus
Royalty

Rent

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

BLM
STATE GOVERNMENT

Alabama
Arkana
California
Colorado
Florida
Illin o is
Kansas
Lou1Sana
Montana
Nebraska
New Mexico
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Exploratory lease
Development lease
Texas
University Lands
General land o ffice
Utah

X
X (l)

X
X (l)

NOTES:
(l)Colorado accepts sealed bid offers of ten dollars per acres bonus or more
I f less than this amount Is received by sealed bids, or none at a l l , the
tract is offered In oral auction.
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The problem of introducing more than one into the negotiations and/or auction is
that the State has then to decide at what rate to trade one item for another

For

example, if one bid is the highest for the bonus payment but not for royalties, and
another is the highest for royalties but not for the bonus payment, who wins the
bid? The State would have to develop a scheme to weigh the various items in a
bid in order to determine the winning bid.

However, if the weights are revealed

the winner is the one with the comparative advantage in those areas most heavily
weighted, if the weights are not revealed, the uncertainty of winning the bid, al
ready implicit within the auction, will be increased, and such an increase may
lower the amounts bid in the auction.

The most common bidding variables are

bonus payments, rent, royalty payments, exploration expenditures, "service" leases,
and percentage rate of net return.

Table 3-1 shows the bidding alternatives used

by various governmental bodies in the U.S.
A bonus payment is a sum of money paid by the bidder to purchase the
lease. With bonus payments the purchaser bears all the risk of the activity and the
seller none.
In a royalty bid auction, the buyer bids on the amount to be paid on produc
tion. The units bid in may be payments per physical unit produced or it may be an
ad valorem arrangement, i.e. a percentage of the value of production. As the price
of oil has risen, the tendency is toward the ad valorem approach

For example, the

traditional royalty in the Middle East before World War II was 4 shillings per ton.
In 1971, the royalty was calculated at 15 percent of the posted price per barrel
[40,p. 51].

There may also be a sliding scale used to calculate the amount of the
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royalty.

In this instance, the percentage varies with output.

system that Montana had until March of 1983.

This was the type of

Royalty percentages were not a

bidding variable, but rather were fixed at 12 1/2 percent for the first 3,000 barrels
produced per year, 17 1/2 percent for the next 3,000 barrels per year, and 25 per
cent for any production over 6,000 barrels per year.

If the ad valorem approach is

used, the seller of the lease bears some risk due to the potential for changes in
future oil prices.
A combination of bonus and royalties enables the seller to bear a portion of
the upside risk that the buyer would be bearing in a bonus bid only situation.

The

seller has no risk of receiving less than the bonus payment, but is trading a higher
bonus payment for the prospect of sharing in the returns of a successful dis
covery.
Percentage profit bids are bids on the percentage of net annual return to be
paid to the seller.

While, this procedure lowers the cost on entry and encourages

high risk leases, it generally involves higher "upside" risk for the seller than other
methods. This procedure is different from the royalty procedure in that it is based
on net return, i.e. after costs are subtracted from gross return.

In fact, one of the

drawbacks of this methods is defining costs, in particular, whether market return
on equity capital should be treated as a cost.

There has been some discussion in

the literature that a major drawback of this method is that there is less incentive
for the firms to minimize its costs of operation [25,p. 789].

Ramsey, however, has

proven that this is not the case in a competitive environment.

"The incentive to

minimize cost and improve efficiency will be neither greater than nor less than for
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any other firm earing a competitive rate of return" [25,p. 127].

It should be noted

that using percentage profit as a bidding variable is rare.
Another item that may be bid on is rent, the rate to be paid for holding the
lease per unit of time.

Rent has come to mean an advance payment for the

privilege of postponing the drilling of wells on the leased tracts, and should not be
confused with payments covering the use of the surface area of the land or with
the concept of economic rent that was discussed earlier. The rental payments act
as an incentive to the lessee to either start drilling as soon as possible or sur
render the lease.

Some of the risk is transferred to the seller in that there is a

real possibility that the lease will remain undrilled and be subsequently returned to
the seller.

If a tract has been returned, bidders will most likely view it as more

risky, since the perception is that any lease that has been surrendered is unlikely
to be profitable.
Another procedure, one that is popular with the governments of Great Britain
and Norway is the shared interest system.

If the firm finds a commercially

profitable amount of oil/gas, then the government is assigned a share in the ven
ture both in costs and profits.

In this scheme the seller bears some of the

"upside" risk, with regard to the quality, quantity, and future price of oil found, but
bears no "downside" risk if none is found. This is clearly an arrangement that only
a national government could negotiate.
The effects of different bidding variables on present net worth are highly de
pendent on the timing of payments.

In general, it can be said that the later the

payment to the state, the less will be the influence on the bidders present net
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value.

Conversely, the earlier the payment, the better it is from the State's point

of view.

The following observations can be made about the effects of differing

payments on the present value calculations.
1. An initial bonus payment is a highly negative weight on the present net
value of the bidder. If this payment must be made immediately, then it
is accounted for at full value, because there is no discounting in the
current time period. The later the bonus can be paid, the better off is
the bidder and worse off is the State.
2. Annual rent payments have less of an impact that the bonus payment
does, and its impact diminishes over time, due to the discounting
process.
3. Royalties differ from both bonus payments and fixed rent payments in
that bonuses and rents have to be paid from the time the lease is
granted, but royalties are not paid until production starts. On the other
hand, production in a lot of areas is much higher in the first few years
and more royalties must then be paid. If the royalty is calculated on a
sliding scale, then there is virtually no influence on small scale produc
tion but there may a substantial influence on large scale production,
the degree of which will depend on the negotiated arrangement.
The possible methods for maximizing the state's percentage of the "rent" (in
the economic sense) are bonus payments, surface rent, royalties, and taxes.

Each

has differing effects as mentioned above.
The average influence of the bonus on the present net value to the bidder
has

already be mentioned. The effect of this to reduce

land that will be drilled.

the amount of marginal

The imposition of large bonus payments is not an ef

ficient method for maximizing public revenue.
Similarly, high surface rents cut into marginal fields, while profitable fields do
not

contribute proportionally to public revenue. This is also viewed as an in

efficient method for maximizing public revenue.
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Another possiblity is the corporate income tax. its effects depend on the use
of the depletion allowance.
ministered

through

the

producers" [40,p. 123].

The depletion allowance is in effect "a subsidy, ad

corporate

income

tax, for the

benefit

of

petroieum

The inclusion of the depletion allowance makes the cor

porate income tax a less than perfect method for maximizing public revenue, be
cause a large part of the rent is "returned" in the form of the depletion allowance.
The corporate tax without the depletion allowance is "...a good

medium for

generating government proceeds as long as the tax rate is not excessively high"
[40,p. 123].

If the tax rate is too high, the amount of reserves that can be

economically recovered, will fall rapidly.
The fixed rate royalty, i.e. the royalty expressed as a fixed percentage of the
unit price of oil, will have less impact on the economically recoverable reserves
than any of the before mentioned options.

However, it will still have some impact

on the amount of economically recoverable reserves, and the higher the royalty
percentage, the greater the impact will be.
mitigate a large portion of that impact.

Sliding scale royalties can be used to

Highly productive fields would pay greater

royalty percentages, and less productive fields would pay lower or no royalties at
all.

The state would still not be receiving the maximum public revenue, but the

sliding scale would achieve this better than the fixed rate royalty.
It can be seen from this discussion that to maximize public revenue from
state lands, the greatest weight should be placed on the use of the corporate in
come tax (without the depletion allowance) and sliding scale royalties.

This is not

to say that surface rents and bonus payments should be done away with.

They
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reduce the risk of zero Income, and provide an Incentive to the purchasers to drill
as soon as possible.

This becomes increasingly important if the state is to time

the development of land that it owns.
The timing of the release of tracts of land for auction and subsequent ex
ploration and development is of great importance to the state. As it now stands, if
there is an increase in the price of oil likely within the next few years, the state
does not have the ability to defer the leasing of tracts, until the time when they
will bring a higher price, and thus more revenue to the state.

In fact, the whole

concept of discounting and present net value computations for determining the
optimum release of tracts over time is worthless if bidders can apply for and bid
on tracts of their choice. One of the most important changes the State should un
dertake is to develop a long term plan to control the release of land for oil and
gas development.

3.7. Lease Tract Information
The process of bidding at auction is a device to reduce the amount of infor
mation the lessor has to have about the property to be leased.

In fact, in simple

cases, the only information the lessor needs to know is that the market demand
(bidding) is competitive, and that the tracts are in fact available for leasing.
From the buyer's point of view, there is fairly common agreement about what
information is relevant for the bidding process.

There is an active market in such

information, and in addition to this geological and geophysical information there is
other information that each firm wishes to acquire about potential lease tracts.
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This information is specific to the firm, and includes not only data that the firm
consider relevant and, consequentially, specializes in, but also the interpretation of
that data reflecting the firms wealth (net worth), geographic concentration, and risk
aversion.

There are many firms which specialize in the gathering and processing

of geophysical information, but are not the business of developing leases them 
selves.
It was noted earlier that a reduction in the risk of a project will increase the
expected bonus payment received by the seller.

So it can be concluded that

"...under competitive conditions, the seller, not the buyers, gains from an increase
in information...provided it is available to all parties" [35,p. 141].

Thus, from the

lessors' point of view the value of additional information which is available to all
potential participants in the auction is the amount of the increase in the expected
value of the bonus payments received.
On the other hand, the information produced by or in the hands of a in
dividual firm is of value only if it is not in the hands of other firms that are com
peting for a particular tract.

The value of that information is the difference be

tween the bonus payment that would have been made had everyone had the same
information, and the payment the firm actually makes.

This scenario is compli

cated when bidder A has information not available to others, but they know that A
has the information, and further know that A knows that they know.

This kind of

theoretical asymmetrical information problem is often analyzed using game theory,
simulations or other techniques.
These situations are interesting to consider, but often the assumptions are
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so restrictive or the analysis is not carried far enough to provide real world
answers to questions that arise during a discussion of bidding strategies and the
effects of different auction processes.
Some lessors (or their agents) worry about the lack of information they have
on the value of the leases (or tracts) to be auctioned.

In reality, it is more impor

tant that the lessors know that the bidders are not acting collusively, and to know
the optimal pattern of leasing, both geographically and over time.
worry about the effect of large bids for lease tracts.

Other lessors

Saying in effect, that if firms

must pay enormous amounts for leases, they will not be able to afford the costs
of exploration and development, or that large bids will force out the smaller firms
and thus reduce competition in the industry.

While at first this may appear to be

sound, in fact bonus bids are large because the firms expect to earn large returns
from the lease accounting for the costs of exploration and development.

If the

bids do become large, small firms can participate In joint ventures with other firms
large or small.
Despite the previous discussion, one might consider that the owner of a
scarce non-renewable resource, like a series of oil bearing lands, needs some in
formation in order to answer the two key questions that face any non-renewable
resource owner; what is the optimal rate of offering, and what is the optimal
geographical distribution of the offering to be?
The details of this decision-making process will not be taken up here, but
that information which is necessary for those decisions should be mentioned
briefly. As has been discussed earlier, detailed geological and geophysical data is

34

of great use to the firms, but even if such information were available at no cost to
the lessor, the "...benefit to him would be quite small" [35,p. 148].

The bidder is

the one that needs that detailed information. All the lease owner needs to know is
what subjective evaluation those bidders are placing on the lease area, and this in
formation is most efficiently learned through the bidding process. The information
which the owner needs then is economic in nature, that information which will en
able him to forecast the expected price for leases.
If the average number of bidders per bidding tract is "too small", then the
number of tracts being let is probably too large.

If the number of bidders per of

fered tract is very "large", then the number of tracts being let is probably too
small.

Ramsey defines "too small" as fewer than three or four bidders on a lease

tract.

"If the number is in excess of fifteen to twenty per lease, the rate (of

offering)

is

probably

too

slow" [35,p.

150]

He

says

the

"...rational

for

the[se]...numbers is that the lower bound indicates a "minimum" number of bids for
the seller to be able to ensure a competitive return" [35,p. 150].

Earlier, it was

noted that the expected return increases with the number of bidders, it should be
mentioned here that this increase diminishes very fast, and three or four bidders
should be considered as a minimum.

Below that number no bids should be ac

cepted on a particular tract. The upper limit, that is when the number of bidders is
large, is suggested "as a first approximation at indicating a situation in which the
rate of lease offerings is slower than the long-run demand..." [35,p. 150].
As was mentioned earlier, the demand for leases is a derived demand and
grows of a desire by producers to maintain an portfolio of lease areas for future
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production.

This demand depends on the expected rate of future exploration, and

if the market is not in equilibrium, on the surplus or deficit inventories of explora
tion tracts held by firms. These inventories of lease tracts vary with oil prices, in
terest rates, lease prices, present and expected future input prices, which affect
production rates and upon various technological and economic factors, which
determine the rate at which lease areas can be brought into production.

The op

timum rate of leasing depends on the demand function that the lessor faces.
Ramsey maintains that changes in the Federal governments lease offerings over
the intermediate to long run would have "...little effect on demand price; that is,
the lease market is competitive on the supply side" [35,p. 147].

If this is true at

the Federal level, we can safely conclude that it is also true for Montana.

Thus, a

reduction in lease offerings will not substantially affect the expected market price
for leases, and the complaint that fewer lease offerings will drive up the cost of
exploration is clearly not valid and can be dismissed from further consideration
(economic consideration at any rate) when planning the timing of the release of
tracts for leasing.

3.8. An Optimal Lease Procedure
Throughout this discussion, I have mentioned the effects of different vari
ables on the leasing process; as well as the informational requirements of both the
lessor and the lessees.

Without repeating that discussion, there are several

recommendations for an "optimal" leasing policy.
The bidding firms have an interest in obtaining information about specific
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tracts to be leased, while Informational needs of the seller are minimal. It is In the
lessor's best interest to see that the firms can acquire the information they con
sider necessary.

It is also In the sellers interest to see that this information is

symmetrically available, that is, each bidder has equal access to the information
that they feel they need.

Note that this does not require that firms have the same

amount or type of information only that there is non-discrimination in the access
to information.

This implies that tracts to be leased need to be announced with

enough lead time to allow all (or most) firms the time to survey tracts before sub
mitting a bid, and that the tracts should be offered at regular intervals so firms
can make efficient inventory decisions.
The geographic dispersion of the tracts should be determined by the demand
for them.

However, the seller should try to make a lease offering as homogeneous

as possible.

This is to equate the "marginal exploration cost", i.e. the cost of ac

quiring information about a particular lease, for all tracts being offered at one auc
tion. This helps maintain the probability of any one tract receiving a bid the same
as the probability of any other tract receiving a bid.

By preventing bidders from

allocating all their resources to tracts, which are clearly in prime areas; they are
encouraged to gather information about, and bid on the unknown speculative
areas. The quality of tracts can be varied from sale to sale as desired.

The long

term timing of the lease sales should be based on expected demand for lease
tracts in the future and their expected price per acre.

This can be modeled using

the approach to be discussed in the statistical chapter.
If Ramsey's rule of not accepting bids on tracts with less than four bidders is

37

followed, then the seller need not establish a minimum or reservation price. Those
ares receiving less than four bids are merely offered again at sometime in the fu
ture.

Just because a tract received less than the minimum number of bidders

does not suggest that it is less valuable than others that received more, perhaps
only two bidders had what they considered adequate information to bid.

A study

done in 1969, has shown that re-issued tracts have same probability of receiving a
given number of bids as first time tracts, and "...the amounts will be the same on
average as ...equivalent tracts" [35,p. 155].
The bidding should be on a bonus amount with a given fixed royalty, but the
royalty levels should be a negotiable item between the seller and all the bidders,
before the bidding begins.

This allows the bidders to determine their optimal

trade-off between risk assumption and expected return.

With the royalty payment

fixed the lessor accepts a portion of the risk. A net-worth maximizing seller could
set a royalty which maximizes the total discounted, expect return.

Chapter 4
Statistical Analysis

4.1. Modeling Theory
Many models are chosen with regard to the underlying mechanisms of the
system.

However, when the system Is too complex, the analyst lacks understand

ing of it, or the necessary data is unavailable, an "empirical" or statistical model is
developed to approximate the data, rather than describe the underlying relation
ships.

Statistical models are used to approximate systems that are so complex

that relevant information about the system can only be statistical in nature and
typically the model is a distinct simplification of the system it is modelling.

The

task is complicated by the fact that the analysis is not aimed at constructing a
complete theory of the system, and thus there can be a number of plausible
models for any given economic phenomenon.
A

statistical

probabilities.

model

is

a

model

that

expresses

outputs

in

terms

of

'Thus, a statistical model Is used in those cases where the output

cannot be expressed as a fixed function of the input variables [38,pg. 4], Tests are
usually performed to assess whether the output from the model yields reasonable
inferences.
Models of broad economic systems generally include a whole network of
relationships, which approximate the interrelationships in the economic structure.
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The single equation model is appropriate when there is no interdependence among
the the variables included in the model.

"Because there are usually two more en

dogenous variables in each relation, it is Impossible to specify which endogenous
variable is the dependent one" [22,pg. 22].

In this study, the oil market in Montana

is assumed to be determined by the national and international markets, and all of
the variables are external (exogenous) to the model, which allows us to use the
single equation type of model.
Another major consideration in formulating a model is its complexity.

It can

be argued that economic systems are themselves very complex and so the models
used to describe them should also be very complex.

In general, however, the goal

of the model is to generate reasonable, accurate predictions without large amounts
of data collection or computation time.

Often this can be accomplished with a

less complex (or more parsimonious) model.
A model of individual bids would include many variables, such as interest
rates,

oil

prices,

the

bidder's

wealth,

tract

location

(and

other

geophysical

information), exploration costs (which are site specific), availability of markets,
number of bidders, etc.

However, when modeling the market, a number of those

variables are too specific, and others are unnecessary.

4.2. Analysis
Typically, the goal of a study such as this would be to develop a model
predicting the future price per acre of lease tracts. However, since the bidders can
change the acreage for sale by requesting that lands be put up for bidding, this

40

creates a series specification problem and it is difficult to isolate the effects of
changes in economic conditions on price alone, i.e. if the quantity supplied is
determined by the buyers it is difficult to accurately estimate the demand response
to changes in market conditions, and using some measure of average price would
tend to underestimate the influence of the important economic variables.
In terms of the problem being examined in the paper, it is also unnecessary,
because the implications to the state of changes in the petroleum market revolve
around changes in total revenue from lease sales and not average per acre price.
Figures 4-1

and 4 -2 show two examples of extremes in market response to

changes in demand.

In figure 4-1 any increase in demand is taken up by an in

crease in quantity supplied.

In this case there is no change in the price level.

In

figure 4-2, there is no change in the quantity supplied and any change must occur
entirely in price.

Contrast these with a more typical situation, in figure 4-3, in

which there is both a price and a quantity response to changes in demand.
Given that both price and quantity change simultaneously, a composite vari
able, TOTREV, the total revenue received by the state from the sale was analysed.
Since this is the number that would be used in analystsing the impact of alter
native leasing schemes, it is a reasonable choice.

Figure 4 -4 and table 4-1 show

the movement in leasing revenue over the period of study, 1971-1981.
By making this change in the predicted (dependent) variable, the accuracy of
the model, i.e. the R^, was improved significantly.
reasons.

This seems to occur for two

Fjfst, since both the price and quantity of land for lease can be varied in

response to changing economic conditions in the oil and gas industry, it would be

f ig u r e
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a good strategy for a bidder to spend the same amount of money for a larger tract
of land, which serves to reduce the variability in price as mentioned above.
Secondly, the minimum bid of $1.50 per acre acts as a floor on the price of many
of the tracts. This also acts to reduce the variability in the lease price.

4.3. Methodology and Statistical Mode!
An attempt was made to use lagged variables to produce a model that could
be used for prediction using current data.

However, when using even a two

quarter lag many of the variables that the theory suggests should be important
were in fact insignificant and the fit of the model was so poor that this approach
was abandoned. The best approach seems to be a model that uses concurrent in -
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TABLE 4-1;
BY QUARTER
YEAR
1971
1971
1971
1971
1972
1972
1972
1972
1973
1973
1973
1973
1974
1974
1974
1974
1975
1975
1975
1975
1976
1976
1976
1976
1977
1977
1977
1977
1978
1978
1978
1978
1979
1979
1979
1979
1980
1980
1980
1980
1981
1981
1981
1981

QUARTER
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4

AVERAGE PRICE
1.50
2.13
2.96
1.58
1.58
1.35
1.80
2.16
3.21
1.57
1.74
2.06
3.17
2.75
4.32
2.59
2.08
2.88
1.85
2.64
3.63
2.93
4.97
6.63
5.92
4.97
8.54
9.33
8.47
5.55
13.58
7.82
5.13
14.53
16.80
16.48
22.58
35.70
19.14
13.88
12.64
16.93
34.28
15.45

TOTAL REVENUE
60459.8
132272.9
189232.8
107361.6
144868.5
330337.9
159914.0
189844.6
614498.5
301139.6
230372.4
84057.6
674527.9
415876.6
345238.2
103456.0
110434.6
264897.6
104200.0
190544.3
214257.1
240646.4
556279.7
417151.9
101024.3
847796.8
591244.3
946409.3
1462940.0
1349452.0
1373948.0
714239.0
751542.3
1148718.0
2158898.0
4354938.0
2714208.0
15538688.0
7519995.0
3528867.0
4676348.0
1888446.0
9857650.0
682572.3
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formation.

That is, in order to predict TOTREV, the total revenue from a sale of

oil and leases, at some point in the future, the user must pick likely values for the
variables in the model.

While this leaves the burden of choosing those values on

the users of the model, it also makes for a much more internally accurate model,
that more precisely pins down the relationships between total revenue and the
other variables. There are a number of large econometric models that can be used
to forecast economic variables such as interest rates, or oil prices and certainly no
lack of predictions.
scope of this project.

These are all complex modeling problems and beyond the
The final model which is discussed below, will allow the

user to take certain projected economic variables or make some assumptions
about the future level of those variables and see what the likely effects will be on
the total revenue from the sale of lease tracts.

It is this aspect of the model that

will be the most useful from a planning point of view. The planner or policymaker
can then project a likely path of total revenue over a given period of time with an
eye toward maximizing the revenue to the state, i.e. the discounted value of the
stream of revenues through time.
Two different analysis approaches were used to determine the best model.
Ordinary least squares regression was used to derive a number of equations under
different conditions and least absolute deviations regression was also used.
A technique call "bootstrapping" was used to account for the possibility nonrandom error terms in the regression and to check the coefficients for bias.

The

bootstrap measure is a nonparametric estimate of the accuracy of the statistic be
ing estimated. The statistic b (any statistic) is calculated a large number of times.
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and the width of the interval that contains 68% of the distribution centered at the
mean is the bootstrap measure of accuracy.

Simply p u t the bootstrap is done by

copying the data a large number of times, randomizing it and then samples of the
same size as the original data set are repeatedly draw from the new data set. This
is equivalent to drawing N observations from a sample of N, w ith replacement,
and amounts to resampling the data space.
samples.

These samples are called bootstrap

In this case, a regression is then run on these samples and the results

are compared using a frequency distribution and a bootstrap statistic.

Next the

bootstrap form of the statistic in question is calculated, which is the mean of the
statistics calculated from the each of the bootstrap sample sets. This allows us to
estimate the bias of the numbers generated in the original regression.

The fluc

tuations in the estimated parameters from the regression of the bootstrap data
sets show the variability of the statistical estimators for this set of data.
There are other means of estimating the the bias and variance of a statistic,
among them are the jackknife and cross-validation.

Efron [11], [12], [13], and

[14] has shown that the bootstrap out performs both of these methods.

The

bootstrap is a very robust statistic, and it is not apt to be highly influenced by a
few influential observations.

4.4. Data
The data on oil lease sales is collected quarterly by The Department of State
Lands, and it includes information on the location of the tract sold, the county it is
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in, its size, the price per acre of the winning bid and the name of the buyer.®
data was collected

by county with the

intention that they

The

would act as a

geographic variable to help explain the quality of a tract, i.e. the likelihood that oil
would be found there.

While there are some counties that appear more likely to

have oil than others, there was no relationship that could be statistically deter
mined.

Furthermore, no relationship seemed to exist between the amount of oil

that was currently being pumped in a particular county and the total revenue ac
counted for by that county in the lease auction.

There may be two possible

reasons for this; first, and probably most important, in the

high

production

counties it is likely that most of the state land available for lease has already been
leased and explored.
lines.

Secondly, the known oil pools are not delineated by county

Thus, a pool could lie in a portion of the county and produce a large

amount of oil, but tracts in another part of the county which are still available for
lease are perceived has having a higher risk associated with them and thus would
not be bid as high as others. This is a consequence of aggregating the leases into
counties.

If the tracts could be identified with a known pool or reservoir, perhaps

this type of geographic variable could act as a proxy for the quality of the tract.
The variables included in the model are the price of oil, the interest rate, and
a measure of U.S. oil production.
The marginal price of oil represents the average price for newly found oil in
the continental United States, and does not represent the actual contract price that

^Appendix A shows the changes in oil leasing patterns across the state during the study period.
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drillers would receive when they brought that oil to market.

Generally, this is not

the most desirable way to proceed, however contract oil prices are often not
available or in the case of a vertically integrated oil company would only represent
a transfer (or accounting) price as the crude is transferred from the production
division or subsidiary to the refining one.

Here the best variable would be the ex

pected price of oil over the lifetime of the project, but for a number of reasons
there is no adequate way to include that kind of information, so actual wellhead
prices are used. This data is from the U.S. Department of Energy and it predeces
sors. Figure 4 -5 shows the path of oil prices over time.
The next variable in the model is the interest rate, which by necessity is im
precise.

The interest rate used in the model, one year U.S. Treasury bonds, only

approximates the interest rate that is available to drillers, but changes in that in
terest rate are assumed to be approximated by changes in One Year Bonds.

Ad

ditionally, the interest rates available for oil field exploration are confidential, while
the One Year Bond rate is readily available from the Federal Reserve.
Given the ease of transporting petroleum and its derived products, theory
suggest that the Montana oil market would be influenced by changes in the U.S. oil
market. The variable used in this study to model that influence, changes in U.S. oil
production, is a proxy for market conditions across the country, and represents the
increase or decrease in thousands of barrels of domestic oil production between
time periods. Figure 4 -6 shows the changes in U.S. oil production over the eleven
year study period. The data is taken from The Oil and Gas Journal.
There are three highly influential observations in this data series.

They occur

FIGURE 4-6:
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at times The Organization Of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced
large price hikes or production cut backs.

This is appears to be due to the

"announcement effect", i.e. decision makers responding to the changes before they
actually occur.

The impacts of these announcements were modeled using a

dummy variable that was set to one when an a price hike or production cutback
was announced and zero all other times.

4.5. Statistical Procedures
The presence of the extreme (or outlier) observations creates a problem
when estimating the relationships between the independent variables mentioned
above and the dependent variable, total revenue.

Two somewhat different statis

tical techniques were used to examine the influence of those three observations
and derive a usable model; ordinary least squares regression and lease absolute
deviations regression.

Both of these methods were used on the full data set of 43

observations and on a data set of 40 observations with the outliers deleted.

Or

dinary least squares regression was also run on the data set of 43 observations
with the dummy variable for OPEC interventions.

In addition, both techniques were

used with principal components to examine the effect of the multicollinearity that
exists in the data set.
Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) was used to estimate the initial
equation. The OLS criteria is designed to find a line that minimizes the sum of the
squared distances

between

the

actual

observations

However, OLS is greatly influenced by outliers.

and the

regression

line.

The effect of an outlier is propor
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tional to the square of its distance from the regression line.

If these outliers are

due to rare events, it is often difficult to accurately estimate their effect in the
regression.

There are several methods for dealing with this type of situation.

Deleting those observations the researcher thinks are causing the problems is one
approach, but this means that some potentially valuable information will be lost.
"As a general rule, outliers should be rejected out of hand only if they can be
traced to causes such as errors in recording..." [9,p. 153].

Another method is to

use a technique that is less sensitive to outliers, such as Least ABSolute deviations
regression (LABS). Where ordinary least squares seeks to minimize the sum of the
squared distance between the predicted and the actual observation, least absolute
deviations, as its name suggests, seeks to minimize the sum of the absolute dis
tance between the predicted and the actual points.

This is considered the loss

function to be minimized, in the case of OLS, the sum of the squared deviations is
minimized, and in LABS, the sum of the absolute deviations is minimized. Thus, in
least absolute deviations, a point that is four units from the regression line is only
exerting four times the influence of a point one unit from the regression line, while
in ordinary least squares such a point would exert sixteen times the influence.
some

"circumstances

observations" [16,p. 361].

least

squares

may

give

undue

weight

to

In

extreme

The problem is one of selecting the loss function, L, to

be minimized when estimating the vector of B's, where L depends on the M
dimensional multivariate distribution and the estimated parameter vector B. "Since
the estimator B is random, as it depends on the random vector Y, the loss incurred
in not knowing the parameter vector will also be random" [24,p. 21].

Since the

53
vector B is not known, the estimation of B is entirely dependent on the choice of
decision rules, i.e. the choice of loss functions to be minimized.

Table 4 -2 shows

how an estimated coefficient, B, changes as the loss function is varied. The choice
of OLS or LABS is determined by the researchers view of the loss function.

If a

quadratic loss function seems appropriate, then OLS is the desired technique. On
the other hand, if a linear loss function seems more appropriate then LABS should
be used.

Change in Coefficient Due to a Change in Technique

OLS W /40 OLS W /43
Value

0.5597

0.7668

Table 4-2:

OLS W/43&D

LABS W /40

LABS W /43

0.6653

0.6630

0.8197

Coefficients Under Various Loss Functions

Principal components is a technique that is used if there is insufficient data
to adequately develop a model, or if there is some degree of multicollinearity in
the independent variables.

The principal components are derived such that they

are linear combinations of the variables, and contain all the variation of the original
variables. They are also derived so they are orthogonal which removes the co llinearity problem in multiple regression.

"The principal component, z.,, is seen to

be a means of capturing the essence of both x., and
either" [42,p. 425].

without totally discarding

There is some concern with regard to the use of principal
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components in regression, because it is difficult to define them. They are artificial
variables that are linear combinations of other variables, and thus not directly
identifiable in economic terms.

However, this does not prevent them from being

used in predictive models. It just makes them hard to interpret

4.6. Results
The coefficients from the final analysis of each technique appear in table 4-3.
InRev is the log transformation of the variable TO TR EV (plotted in figure 4-7),
InPRC is the log transformation of the price of oil in the U.S., In Y R B l is the log of
the interest rates on one year Treasury bonds, difP R is the change in the amount
of oil produced in the U.S., and OPEC is a binomial variable (0,1) that is used to
model the OPEC oil shocks in 1972 and 1979.

These transformations are used to

improve the fit of the data.

BASIC VARIABLE COEFFICIENTS

COEFFICIENTS
TECHNIQUE
OLS W/40
OLS W/43
OLS W/43&0
LABS W/40
LABS W/43

OPEC

LNPRC

LNYRBl

DIFPR

CONSTANT

1.6002

0.5597
0.7 6 6 8
0.66 53
0.66 30
0 .8 19 7

1.8079
1.5282
1.5973
1.2620
0.9903

0.00161
0.00170
0.00171
0.00102
0.00097

8 .23 00
8 .3 96 2
8.3968
9 .1 82 0
9 .3 8 1 6

Table 4-3:

Actual coefficients
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4.6.1. OLS Regression
The final OLS equation with diagnostic statistics appears in table 4-4.

The

coefficients in the regression equation measure the change in InREV associated
with a unit change in the particular variable.

For example, a one unit change in

the logged price of oil results in a 0.6623 change in the logged total revenue,

holding all others variables constant.
ficients.

Beneath the equation are the beta coef

They are obtained by normalizing the original data for each variable by

subtracting its mean and dividing by its estimated standard deviation, and then
regressing this transformed data.

The beta coefficients are useful when making

comparisons of the relative Importance of the different independent variables in
the regression model, which is not possible with the b coefficients, because the
variables are measured in different units and have different variances [34,pg. 90].
The beta coefficient adjusts the unstandardized coefficients by the ratio of the
standard deviation of the independent variable to the standard deviation of the de
pendent.

Examining the beta coefficients, we note that the variable for the price of

oil, InPRC, and the variable for the cost of money, In Y R B l, have the greatest im
pact, and the variable for OPEC impacts has less impact and the variable for
domestic production of crude, difPR has the least.
Table 4 -5 and figures 4 -8 and 4 -9 show the total of the deviations of the
predicted from the actual observation for both squared deviations and absolute
deviations criteria, using as a measure, all 43 observations or only the 40 non
outlier observations.

This total is one way to examine the accuracy of a particular

model. The greater sum of the distances (either squared or absolute), the less ac-

TABLE 4-4;

The f in a l OLS equation (w ith OPEC v a ria b le ) Is :

InREV = 8.388 + .66231nPRC + 1.60581nYRBl + .00171d1fPR + 1.5980PEC

R SQUARE
ADJUSTED R SQUARE
STANDARD ERROR

VARIABLE

.75918
.73383
.70394

B

DURBIN-UATSON
F - STATISTIC

SE B

1.835
29.984

95% CONFONCE INTRVL B

BETA

LNPRC
.66233
.22755
.20167
1.12299
1.59752
OPEC
.42644
.73424
2.46079
LNYRBl
1.60577
.53912
.51439
2.69716
1.712107E-03 6.26075E-04 4.446845E-04 2.979529E-03
DIFPR
(CONSTANT)
8.38800
.73162
6.90691
9.86909

.38264
.30180
.38506
.22169

SE BETA
.13145
.08056
.12928
.08107

T
2.911
3.746
2.979
2.735
11.465

SIG T
.0060
.0006
.0050
.0094
.0000

UI

TABLE 4-5:
D E V IA T IO N S

FROM ACTUAL O BSERVA TIO NS U S IN G V A R IO U S
U S IN G

OLS W /4 0

OLS W /4 3

E S T IM A T IO N

V A R IA B L E S

OLS W /4 3 & D

TE C H N IQ U E S
U S IN G

LABS W /4 0

LABS W / 4 3

OLS W / 4 0

P R IN C IP A L

OLS W / 4 3

LABS

COMPONENTS

/4 0

LABS W / 4 3

A LL 4 3 OBS
SQUARED
DEV.
ABSOLUTE D E V .

2 6 .9 6
27.28

25.89
27.23

18.91
23.76

27.75
26.77

27.66
26.56

14.76
19.73

14.10
19.70

15.32
19.26

15.00
19.21

W IT H 4 0 OBS
SQUARED
DEV.
ABSOLUTE DEV.

18.25
22.41

19.10

18.36
22.54

2 0 . 10

22.86

20.98
22.25

10.65
16.37

11.18
16.89

11.30
15.89

11.38
16.03

22.23
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curate the model is.

For example, the OLS variable model built on 43 observations

with the dumm y variable (OLS W /43& D ) is more accurate than any of the other
OLS or LABS models using all 43 observations as a criteria, but the LABS model
built on 40 observations is more accurate using as a criteria of accuracy the total
distance

(absolute

deviations)

from

the

40

non-outlier

observations

to

the

predicted observations.

4.6.2. OLS Diagnostics
The diagnostic statistics for the OLS equation are beneath it.

They include

measures of accuracy of the model, the proportion of total variation explained, ac
curacy of the individual parameters, and others.
The R squared (Rf) is the proportion of the total variation of the dependent
variable explained by the regression, and is another way of identifying the accuracy
of a model.

It varies between 0.00 and 1.00 with an

of 0.00 occuring when the

regression equation explains none of the variation in the dependent variable and
an R^ of 1.00 indicating that the equation perfectly estimates the dependent vari
able.

The R^ value is sensitive to the number of parameters to be estimated be

cause it does not account for the number of degrees of freedom in the analysis.
With enough explanatory variables, it would be possible to fit every point in the
data with the regression equation and thus obtain an R^ of 1.00.

We can account

for this reduction in degrees of freedom by using the adjusted R^.
was 0.7592 and the adjusted R^ is 0.7338.

The OLS R^

It is this last figure which more ac

curately states the percentage of variation that is explained by the above equation.
Approximately 73 percent of the variation in the log transformed variable T O T R E V
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is explained by this regression.
The T-statistics are used to test the significance of each coefficient.
significance levels are next to the T values.

Those

The highest significance is less than

.01, which means that we can reject the null hypothesis (with 99% confidence) that
the parameter being estimated is equal to zero. This indicates that the relationship
between the independent variable and the dependent, InREV, is statistically sig
nificant.
The F statistic can be used to test the significance of the entire equation and
is useful for joint tests of significance.
parameters are equal to zero.

The null hypothesis is that all the

In this case the F value is so high that the null

hypothesis can be rejected with almost 100 percent certainty.
One of the assumption of least squares regression specifies the statistical
independence of the error terms, i.e. the disturbance term is not auto-correlated.
In economic studies such as this one, which involve tim e-series data this assump
tion is often violated.

The consequence of this is that the variances of the es

timates of the b's tend to be overstated, thus the calculation of the confidence in
terval becomes less reliable. This autocorrelation (or serial correlation) in the data
can lead to under estimation of the variance of the b's through two channels,
increases the true variance and decreases the estimate of the variance.

it

This in

creases the probability of a Type I error. A Type I error is that of rejecting the null
hypothesis when it is actually true.
are equal to zero.

In this case, the null hypothesis is that the b's

Another consequence of autocorrelation in ordinary least

squares is that the predictions are not efficient, in that they will have a larger
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variance than other econometric techniques.
measure of first-order serial correlation.

The Durbin-Watson statistic is a

The Durbin-Watson in the OLS equation

is 1.83, which is above the critical value of 1.74 (6% level) so the null hypothesis,
that first-order serial correlation exists, can be rejected at the 96% level [10,p. X].
One method of correcting for auto-correlation is the Cochrane-Orcutt itera
tive technique, which in addition to estimating the parameters also estimates the
value of rho, the first order serial correlation coefficient.

When the Cochrane-

Orcutt technique was applied to this data the beta coefficients did not change sig
nificantly and rho was highly insignificant.

This reinforces the conclusion of the

Durbin-Watson statistic that serial correlation is not a problem in this data.

4.6.3. Least Absolute Deviations Regression
The LABS variables are the same as those used in the OLS equations, except
that the OPEC variable has been excluded.

Since it is hard (or impossible) to

forecast that type of market intervention, it seems reasonable to exclude it from a
forecasting model.

It is interesting to note the strong influence the announcement

effect has on the lease sale revenues.

The LABS estimates are derived using a

linear programming technique that minimizes the sum of the absolute distance be
tween the actual observations and the predicted ones.

The differences between

the OLS and the LABS regressions are due to the influence of those highly influen
tial points that occured as a result of an OPEC decision.

The OLS estimates are

strongly influenced by these observations, which shifts the equation and may bias
the forecasts.
Figures 4 -8 and 4 -9 show the differences between the different methods
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used to estimate the equation, assuming either a quadratic loss function (OLS) or a
linear one (LABS), for the entire data set of 43 observations and the restricted one
excluding the 3 highly influential observations.
ferences among the various methods.

It is interesting to note the dif

The OLS regression on 43 cases with the

dummy variable clearly does a better job of explaining the variation in LN R EV
when measured across all 43 observations using either the squared deviations or
absolute deviations criteria.

However, since the purpose of this section is to de

velop an equation for forecasting, and interventions such as those modeled by
OPEC are hard to foresee, we shall drop the variable OPEC and consider the
criteria to be "the best fit on the 40 observations that don't include those highly
influential observations." It is apparent that the OLS regression on 40 observations
is a better fit with a squared error loss function, and the LABS on 40 observations
with a linear loss function.

This is as one would expect since each of these

methods is intended to minimize the sum of either squared or absolute deviations.

4.6.4. Multicollinearity
The absence of multicollinearity is one of the assumptions behind ordinary
least squares regression.

The effects of multicollinearity are inconclusive.

While

multicollinearity does not bias the estimates, the value of the coefficients may be
come unstable and the standard errors are not accurate. This leads to the danger
of mis-specification or excluding a variable because it appears to be insignificant
due to its large standard error, when in fact the variable is an important com
ponent in explain the changes in the dependent variable.

"The reason why mul

ticollinearity Is of such importance is that ...it is impossible to determine best
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linear unbiased estimators of the coefficients of the equation" [24,p. 14].
data there is a certain amount of coiiinearity present.

In this

The two variables InPRC

and In Y R B l appear to be linearly related. This can be detected with two methods.
First the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the variables InPRC and In Y R B l, which
are indicators of multicoliinearity, are both high enough to indicate the presence of
some kind of coilinearity.
the correiation matrix,

The ViF is derived from the diagonal of the inverse of

in a perfectiy orthogonal matrix the VIF's are 1.00.

In the

data matrix used here, the VIF's were 2.72, 1.02, 2.63, and 1.03 for InPRC, OPEC,
InY R B l, and difP R respectively.

The values for InPRC and In Y R B l suggest that

there is some degree of muiticoiiinearity in the data.

Another approach is to ex

amine the squared muitipie correiations of the exogenous variabies. These are ef
fectively the R-squared values when one of the variables is regressed on the
others.

For this data, they are 0.632, 0.023, 0.620, and 0.035 in the same order as

above. The values for InPRC and In Y R B l again suggest that some form of linear
relationship exists in the data.
Multicollinearity is very often a problem in economic data, it makes it difficult
to estimate the separate effects of the variables with any precision,

in addition,

variables that appear to be insignificant and are thus dropped from the analysis,
may in fact have valuable explanatory power.

While multicollinearity affects the

individual coefficients, it does not affect the the predictive accuracy of the equa
tion, as long as "the pattern of interrelationships among the explanatory variables
is the same in the forecast period as in the sample period" [27,p. 453].

Muiticoi

iinearity affects the variabies that are included in the regression equation.

Those
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variables which are highly coiiinear will tend to displace each other in the regres
sion equation. The theory suggests that there are a number of variables that may
influence the decision of how many tracts to bid on and what to pay, but many of
them are linearly related to others and this makes it difficult to include them in an
equation.
One way around this problem is to develop principal components from the
variables and then regress these on the dependent variable, total revenue.

Prin

cipal components are linear combinations of the variables and are derived in such
a way as to "explain as much of the total variations in the data as possible with as
few of the factors [principal components] as possible" [34,p. 389].

These principal

components are orthogonal to each other, meaning they are perfectly uncorreiated.
When LN R EV is regressed on these principal components, the percentage of
the variation in LN REV that is explained is higher than when using just variables
in the equation.

Since principal components is a data reduction technique and

may reduce the dimensionality of the data space, it is difficult to interpret the
principal components.

However, they can be usefully employed in prediction with

the understanding that if the assumption of a constant relationship among the
variables in the components is violated, the prediction will be in error.
Looking at table 4 -5 again, we can see that the principal component regres
sion is better at fitting the data than any of the models that use standard vari
ables.

Here again we have the choice of using linear error loss, or squared error

loss, depending on how deviations from the estimated regression line are to
penalized.

The principal components OLS regression is noted in Table 4 -6 along
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TABLE 4-6:

The fin a l P rin cip a l components

equation is :

InREV = 13.26 + 1.05PC1 + 0.439PC2 - 0.365PC3 - 0.311PC4

R SQUARE
ADJUSTED R SQUARE
STANDARD ERROR
VARIABLE
PCI
PC2
PC3
PC4
(CONSTANT)

.81982
.80085
.60889

DURBIN-WATSON
F - STATISTIC

6

SE B

1.05050
.43909
-.36527
-.31061
13.26335

.09395
.09395
.09395
.09395
.09286

2.39006
43.22473

95% CONFDNCE INTRVL B
.86030
.24889
-.55547
-.50081
13.07538

BETA

1.24070 .76991
.62929 .32181
-.17507 .26771
-.12041 -.22764
13.45133

SE BETA
.06886
.06886
.06886
.06886

T

11.181
4.673
-3.888
-3.306
142.839

SIG T
.0000
.0000
.0004
.0021
.0000

Composition o f P rin cip a l Components
VARIABLE
LRR
LST
LNYRBl
LNPP
LNPRC

PCI
0.96326
-0.92419
0.79540
-0.69630
0.97050

PC2
0.08734
0.08922
0.57002
0.69091
0.02680

PC3
-0.11703
0.34784
0.17211
-0.17896
0.17759

PC4
0.22497
0.12940
-0.04424
-0.00601
-0.06812

•Si

ro
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with the composition of the principal components. The variables that compose the
four factors (or components) are InRR, the logarithm of the number of active
rotary drilling in the U.S., InST, the logarithm of Montana state oil production,
In Y R B l, the logarithm of one year Treasury bills, InPP, the logarithm of U.S.
domestic oil production and InPRC, the logarithm of U.S. oil prices.

These data

series are shown if figures 4-10, 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, and 4-14.
The bar charts in figures 4 -15 and 4-16, as explained before, show the dif
ferences in the total residual for both absolute deviations and squared deviations
measured across all 43 observations or the 40 that do not include the outliers.

It

is evident from these figures that there is not much difference between the LABS
w /40 and the LABS w /43 models.

Using a absolute deviations criteria, they are

consistently better across both the 43 observation series and the 40 non-outlier
observation series.

4.6.5. Bootstrap
Another of the important assumptions behind regression analysis is that the
random fluctuations or errors are distributed about the true value in a normal or
Gaussian distribution.
verifiable.

This assumption is both necessary for regression and un-

Efron [12] has developed a technique, called the "bootstrap", used for

verifying the results, that does not rely on assumptions of normality.

The

bootstrap is used to determine the statistical accuracy of parameters determined
from the data.

The bootstrap method "...requireEs] very little in the way of model

ing, assumptions, or analysis, and can be applied in an automatic way to any
situation, no matter how complicated" ll4,p. 36].
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For this study, the data set consisted of the 43 quarterly observations al
ready discussed.

The data set was used to form 5000 bootstrap samples that

were then regressed.
the

The coefficients on the dependent variables, the constant,

and the F value were then bootstrapped.

Some sample bootstrap distribu

tion plot are shown in figures 4-17, 4 -18, 4 -19, 4-20, 4-21, 4-22, 4 -23 for illustra
tive purposes.

The bootstrap values and the bootstrap statistics for the variable

regressions are shown in table 4 -7 and for the principal component regressions in
table 4-8.
Note that many of the statistics bootstrapped are close to the numbers from
the original regression.

In particular, the coefficient on InPRC and the coefficient

on In Y R B l, and the constant were very close to those found in the regression.
These distributions are shown on the graphs, and in most cases the regression
coefficient is in the middle of the distribution,

4.7. Forecasting Model
Given the extreme values that occurred with the OPEC announcements, it
seems inappropriate to use a quadratic loss function, since these extreme obser
vations are very influential in OLS regressions. The goal of the model is to predict
the best all around response in the total lease revenue to changes in market con
ditions.

Since, the "typical" situation does not include OPEC interventions, it does

not seem valid to allow them to influence the model as strongly as they do in an
OLS regression.

Furthermore, the three influential observations are caused by a

process (OPEC decision making) that is hard (or impossible) to model, so it seems
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T a b le 4 - 7 :

OPEC

BOOTSTRAP COEFFICENTS
TECHNIQUE
OLS W/40

OLS W/43
OLS W/43&D

-

1.6520
( .5 5 0 )

LABS W/40

-

LABS W/43

-

V a r ia b le B o otstrap C o e fflc e n ts

LNPRC

LNYRBl

0.56 21
(.2 1 9 )

1.8010
(.5 8 2 )

0.00171
(.0 0 0 6 )

8 .2 3 9 0
(.8 0 2 )

0 .7 5 0 5
(.3 0 4 )

1.5622
(.7 0 3 )

0.00180
(.0 0 0 7 )

8 .3 6 9 0
(.8 6 9 )

0 .6 3 4 0
(.1 9 9 )

1.5990
(.3 6 9 )

0.00181
(.0 0 0 6 )

8 .3 6 7 0
(.7 7 3 )

0 .5 4 6 6
(.3 9 9 )

1.7540
(.6 8 1 )

0.00158
(.0 0 0 8 )

8.3 7 8 0
(.8 7 3 )

0.6 7 5 6
(.4 3 8 )

1.5700
(1 .1 6 )

0.00151
(.0 0 0 9 )

8 .5 2 0 0
(1 .5 5 )

DIFPR

NOTEiThe number in p a re n th e s is is th e bo otstrap measure.

CONSTANT
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TABLE 4 -8 ;

ACTUAL AND BOOTSTRAP COEFFICIENTS USING VARIOUS ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES
PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS COEFFICIENTS
PCI
COEFFICIENTS
TECHNIQUE
OLS W/40
OLS W/43
LABS W/40
LABS W/43

PC2

PC3

PC4

CONSTAN'

1.0230
1.0507
0 .9 6 2 5
0.9 7 9 1

0 .4 0 2 4
0 .4 3 9 4
0 .3 8 6 4
0 .4 2 3 5

-0 .3 1 1 8
-0 .3 6 5 4
-0 .3 8 2 0
-0 .3 4 0 5

-0 .2 4 5 0
-0 .3 1 1 3
-0 .3 0 3 2
-0 .3 6 0 2

13.185
13.263
13.130
13.150

BOOTSTRAP COEFFICENTS
TECHNIQUE
1.0220
OLS W/40
( .0 9 0 )

0 .3 9 9 6
(.1 0 3 )

-0 .3 1 3 2
(.0 7 2 )

-0 .2 4 8 8
( .1 2 4 )

13.180
(.0 8 4 )

OLS W/43

1.0490
( .0 9 8 )

0 .4 37 9
(.1 0 4 )

-0 .3 6 6 5
(.0 7 9 )

-0 .3 1 5 9
( .1 3 4 )

13.260
( .0 9 0 )

LABS W/40

0 .9 9 4 7
( .1 2 4 )

0 .4 04 1
( .1 4 3 )

-0 .3 0 5 6
(.1 2 4 )

-0 .2 6 4 0
(.1 6 2 )

13.160
(.1 3 7 )

LABS W/43

1 .023
(.1 3 0 )

0.43 73
( .1 5 3 )

-0 .3 2 6 0
(.1 2 6 )

-0 .3 1 2 1
(.1 8 6 )

13.210
(.1 4 3 )

NOTErThe number in p a re n th e s is is th e b o o ts tra p measure.
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useful to use a technique that is not highly influenced by those extreme obser
vations, but still includes them for the potentially useful information that they con
tain.

Various alternative methods have been explored, and the results have been

presented in both statistical as well as graphical form.

The variable form of the

equation includes variables that are coiiinear with other variables in the equation
and other candidate variables, so a principal components approach was taken
using both least squares and least absolute deviations loss functions.
sions where

bootstrapped to examine the

All regres

sampling effects and each of the

methods showed varying degrees of bias.
Given all these considerations, it is the opinion of the writer that the prin
cipal component LABS regression built on all 43 observations is the most useful
for predictive purposes, i.e.
TOTAL REVENUE * 13.50 + 0.9791 PC i + 0.4235PC2 “ 0.3405PC - 0.3602PC4
where the prinicipal components are composed of the variables, InRR, InST,
In Y R B l, InPP, and InPRC as discussed earlier.

Chapter 5
The Future World Oil Market

In any long run analysis of the demand for petroleum and hence for drilling
rights, it is important to consider what the condition of petroleum supplies will be
in the future.

The supply of petroleum is clearly related to its price.

Conversely,

the "market price of crude oil...has always been very sensitive to the laws of
supply and demand" [20,p. 6].

As prices increase, there is a greater incentive to

invest in exploration and development in order to increase production and thus
profits, and if the supply is reduced for a given demand, the price will rise.

The

supply of oil is the sum of all oil from oil wells plus the supply of synthetic fuels
from tar sands, coal liquefaction and shale.

These latter sources require certain

expensive production processes that are very energy intensive.

As the price of

energy rises, the cost of producing them also rises, therefore they are relevant
only at prices high enough to pay the producer these higher costs and still
generate a normal

profit.

There have been some subsidies paid for minor

demonstration synthetic fuels plants, but all the major programs have been can
celled, so there appears to be no real supply implications for the petroleum market
from these sources in the next eight to ten years.
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5.1. Supply
In the event of large new discoveries in Alaska, the continental shelf or other
places around the world, the price of petroleum might remain fairly constant or
only decline slightly.

Speculation about the crude oil reserve base is as risky as

speculation about future consumption levels, and depends on assumptions of ac
cessibility of reserves, future oil prices, discovery rates, efficiency of recovery, size
of reserves and the technical details of production in less accessible areas.
However, several recent studies allow us to make the following observations about
the world supply of oil.
Taken as a group, the non-Communist industrialized countries will experience
no significant increases in the production of oil.

In fact, by the year 2000, produc

tion in these countries may decrease by as much as 50%.

It appears that

"...geology is the primary limiting factor" (29,p. 35].
I will forego discussion of the developed countries, with the exception of the
United States, since it is the largest single producer.
United States oil production in the future will probable arise from four prin
cipal sources: (1) primary, and secondary recovery from existing proven reserves of
26.5 billion barrels [29,p. 36], (2) natural gas liquids, (3) primary and secondary
recovery from additions to existing reserves and (4) the use of enhanced or ter
tiary recovery techniques.

Primary and secondary recovery from existing reserves

can be expected to decrease from 8.1 MBD in 1979 to 4.7 MBD in 1985 and 0.8
MBD in the year 2000. This assumes that all U.S. oil fields produce at a rate of 1/8
of known reserves [29,p. 37].

United States production in the year 2000 may range
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Table 5-1:

Petroleum Production Forecast For OECO

PETROLEUM PRODUCTION FORECASTS FOR THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
1979

2000

1985

U nite d S ta te s
N orth sea
Canada
o th e r Developed c o u n trie s

10.2
2.1
1.8
.8

7 .2 -8 .6
2 .8 -4 .0
1 .6 -1 .8
.8 _ *

4-7
1 .7 -3 .0
1-2
.8 _ *

TOTAL
(may n o t add due to ro u n d in g )

14.9

13-15.5

7.5-13

* range o f p ro d u c tio n considered in s ig n if ic a n t f o r e stim a te s o f t o t a l
petroleum a v a i l a b i l i t y .

Table 5-2:

U.S. Petroleum Production Forecast

U.S. PETROLEUM PRODUCTION FORECASTS (MBD)

P rim ary and secondary
re covery from e x is tin g
1979 reserve s

1979

1985

YEAR
1990

1995

2000

8.1

4.7

2.7

1.4

0.8

0 . 8- 1.5

0 . 8- 2.1

0 .7 -2 .4

0 .7 -2 .5

P rim ary and secondary
re covery from a d d ito n s
to reserves
N atural gas L iq u id s

1.7

1 .2 -1 .5

1 .1 -1 .4

1 .1 -1 .3

1 .0 -1 .2 5

P rod uction from
enhanced re co ve ry
techniques

0 .4

0 .5 -0 .9

0 .7 -1 .4

1 .1 -2 .0

1 .5 -2 .5

5 .3 -7 .6

4 .3 -7 .1

4 .0 -7 .0

TOTALS

10.2

7 .2 -8 .6

(note:colum n may not sum to t o t a ls due to rounding)
Source: pages 35 & 26,
World Petroleum A v a i l a b i l i t y , A Technical Memorandum
C ongressional O ffic e o f Technology Assessment, Washington
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between four and seven million barrels per day (MBD). The high estimate assumes
the addition of one billion barrels to proven reserves and the greatly increased use
of enhanced (tertiary) recovery techniques.
production of about 10 MBD.

This compares with the current U.S.

Table 5-1 shows the projections of The Congres

sional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) for the next twenty years within the
Developed Countries, and Table 5-2, the breakdown of the U.S. numbers.
OPEC production is not expected to rise significantly over the next twenty
years from its current level of 31 MBD.

Since the end of the OPEC oil embargo in

1973, total average annual OPEC oil production has remained fairly constant,
changing less than 1 MBD from the 1979 average of 31.4 MBD.

Exxon estimated

OPEC liquid petroleum production at 33 MBD in 1990 and 2000 [15,p. 38]. OTA es
timates a range of 28.5-35 MBD by 1985 and a range of 27-37 MBD in 2000 [29].
Any possibility of increased production within the OPEC nations will have to
come from Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and possibly Iraq. The
first four countries have the known reserves to sustain more than marginal in
creases in production.

Iraq has the estimated potential to do so.

This group will

most likely continue to restrain production for political and social reasons rather
than due to resource constraints.
While the Saudi's have the capacity to produce at levels of 12 MBD through
2005 with existing reserves [6], they have announced that their intention is not to
exceed 9.5 MBD even under conditions of higher levels of capacity [32].

OTA

projects Saudi production to range between 8.5 MBD and 12.0 MBD by 2000 [29].
Iranian production over the last several years has flucuated greatly.

In April
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1980, the production rate of Iranian crude was reported to be 2.7 MBO, by May of
that year It had declined to a reported level of 1.1 MBD [31].
are below the pre-revolution level of 3 MBD.
levels of production

Both of these levels

According to the CIA sustained

above 4 MBD are "...unlikely without significant external

assistance" [4].
Iraq Is the biggest question mark in OPEC.

Forecasts for Iraqi production are

subject to the twin considerations of political and geological uncertainty.

Politi

cally, the Iraqis have expressed opposing views on the future production levels
they want to maintain.

The CIA reports the Iraqi oil minister has expressed a

desire to produce at 60 percent of capacity [3,p. 6]. In addition the Iraqi's are cur
rently involved In a war with the Iranians, a side effect of which has been the
destruction of a substantial part of the oil transportation infrastructure at the Shatt
al Arab oil terminals.

However the Iraqi government Is trying to assert some in

fluence in the Third World.

Petroleum Intelligence Weekly reports that as of April,

1980 the Iraqi government has announced 15 long term low interest loans in com
pensation for oil price hikes [30,p.15].

If this is true, the government will want to

repair the damaged oil terminals and then increase production in order to use both
the produced oil and the revenues from that increased production in order to
maintain influence in the developing world.
From a geological point of view, there are a large number of undrllled struc
tures in Iraqi territory.

It is certain that at least a portion of these structures will

yield oil in profitable quantities.

In 1977, the CIA suggested possible production

levels in the 5 to 6 MBD area where possible by the year 1986 [3].

In view of the
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currently war and the weakness In current world demand for petroleum products,
these levels seem somewhat optimistic.

Current plans call for an Increase in sus

tained production to 4.5 MBD with some possible increase after 1985.

OTA

projects Iraqi production in the range of 2.7 to 4.5 MBD in 1985 and 3 to 5 MBD in

2000 .
Abu Dhabi, the largest producer in the United Arab Emirates, has plans to in
crease production from 2 to about 3 MBD before the end of decade [28,p. 74].

At

the present time government restrictions limit production in Abu Dhabi to 1.4 MBD.
The other two emirates, Duban and Sharjah, currently lift about .4 MBD with no in
crease in production likely.

OTA estimates total UAE production will range be

tween the current level of 1.9 MBD to 2.5 MBD if the government restrictions are
lifted [29,p. 52].
Kuwait

has

consistently

aimed

its

production

at

conserving

resources.

Production was level during the years 1974-1978 at 2 MBD despite an installed
capacity which would have allowed them to greatly increase production.

OTA es

timates that crude oil production in Kuwait for the rest of the century will range
between 1.5 and 2.0 MBD [29,p. 52]
The rest of the countries in OPEC (Algeria, Gabon, Libya, Qatar, Indonesia,
Ecuador, Venezuela) are producing at close to the maximum possible rate.

While

there is a chance for marginal increases in production in some of the countries,
these may well be offset by declines in the production rates of other countries.
OTA projects levels of 9.5 to 10.5 MBD for these other OPEC countries [29,P. 53].
This compares with a 1979 production average of 10.5 MBD. With the exception of
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Libya, current reserves in these remaining OPEC countries are not large enough to
maintain these levels of extraction through the year 2000.

Thus OTA estimates a

decline in production to the 8 to 10 MBD range by 2000.
There has been some discussion over what role OPEC will play in the future.
This depends on their ability to maintain their cartel role in the face of increasing
non-OPEC production and decline consumption in the OECD countries.

Stephen

Salent [37] has shown that when a production cartel does not have total control
over available reserves of an exhaustible resource, the occurence of monopoly
profits creates proportionally larger profits for those producers outside the cartel.
This encourages greater production by the "competitive fringe", that group of
producers outside the cartel who benefit by the actions of the cartel, but do not
have to abide by its rules.
has to cut back production.

In order to maintain price, ceteris paribus, the cartel
Being outside the cartel, the fringe producer has no

incentive to cut back, rather the availability of reserves beyond the control of the
cartel, coupled with the high rates of return available lead to more exploration and
yet a larger supply.

In these circumstances, the cartel is faced with either lower

ing production in order to maintain price, thereby lowering their market share, or
reducing their price in an attempt to maintain market share. On March 3, 1983 The
Wali Street Journal reported that "U.S. imports of crude oil dropped to an 11-year
low in the week ended Feb. 25..." [41,p. 15]. This was due in part to the recession
in the United States, and in part to increasing conservations coupled with expand
ing domestic production.
The higher price of oil also makes substitutes, i.e. alternative sources of
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energy; nuclear, coal, gas, solar, and conservation® more attractive.

One Important

difference between switching to domestic from imported oil and the replacement
of oil by substitutes is that many substitutes once in place will not be abandoned
without a substantial and perceptibly long term drop in the price of oil.
largely due to the high fixed cost of switching fuels.

This is

In fact, the higher the per

centage of fixed (i.e. capital) cost to variable (fuel) cost, the less likely will be a
switch back to oil.

In the case of increased efficiency (conservation), there will

probably never be a switch back to greater energy consumption per unit output
over the lifetime of the plant.
All

major energy

use

projections, even those assuming

low worldwide

growth in economic activity and plausible assumptions of conservation, see a gap
between projected supply and demand, unless there is a substantial addition of
nuclear power, which does not seem to be on the horizon.

This divergence be

tween supply and demand, market disequilibrium, will put upward pressure on oil
and gas prices.

The timing and extent of the price changes will depend on world

economic conditions, the effectiveness of conservation programs, government
policies such as taxation and regulation, and any possibility of some kind of
production cut-back or embargo. The effect of synthetic fuel subsidies is interest
ing

and

somewhat

unexpected.

The

U.S.

Synfuels

Corporation, the

quasi

government corporation that is subsidizing the building of synthetic fuels plants

®ln m any studies conservation is considered in both the supply and dem and for energy. Given that
the use of m ore insulation, or a m ore e ffic ien t car, gets the sam e "work" done w ith less energy, thus
freein g up supplies of energy for oth er uses, I w ill abide by that convention.
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may ultimately be contributing to the problem of a reduced supply and thus higher
prices within the continental United States.

Baumol and Wolff suggest that sub

sidies to "innovative energy sources" have a "negative net yield of petroleum" [1,p.
892].

The subsidies cause a net decrease in petroleum yield because the inputs

that could have been used in oil production are instead used in the less efficient
synthetic fuel project.

If the subsidies do not lead to the substitution of energy

inputs throughout the economy, then the price of oil must either be high enough
to eventually pay for the cost of synthetic fuel oil or the subsidy must extend in
definitely.

If the subsidy is removed and the project is unable to compete suc

cessfully and folds, there is a loss of liquid fuels to the market.
reduction must then lead to higher prices.

This supply

Thus the subsidies will have the effect

of both reducing the supply of petroleum in the long-run and eventually causing
an increase in the price of all liquid fuels to the extent that synthetic coal products
can be substituted for petroleum products and providing the subsidy is not main
tained indefinitely.
OPEC is thus doubly threatened by competition and the loss of market share.
First from other producers, which can be countered with price reductions or coer
cion.

Secondly from substitutes, which become more attractive at higher oil

prices, which OPEC can not affect except perhaps in the very long run. It is worth
noting that since a large percentage of the oil traded in the world market is used
for transportation, with the exception of conservation the effect of substitute fuels
in the world oil market will be fairly small.
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5.2. Demand
The demand for any energy input is a function of two main factors - the
price of energy and the level of income. As in the case of many products, price is
the main determinant of demand, and with rare exceptions the quantity demanded
varies inversely with the price.
The real price of oil declined from the end of World War II until 1967.
had two important effects.

This

First, it accelerated the substitution of oil for coal, and

secondly it speeded up the development of energy-intensive technologies and
products while simultaneously retarded the development of energy-conserving
ones.

A study done in 1974 by Houthakker and Kennedy concludes that "if the

[real] price of energy in 1970 had been at the 1948 level (i.e. about double the ac
tual 1970 level), consumption in 1970 would have been 20 percent lower than it
actually was".
The income effect causes the demand for energy to rise as real income rises
[7,p. 34].

The current world-wide recession Is having a profound effect on the

demand portion of the market. A reduction in GNP has a ripple effect through out
the

entire economy.

Reduced demand, reduced production, reduced income,

reduced consumption, all lead to a smaller demand for liquid fuels.

Conservation

and fuel switching make it unlikely that demand will return to the pre-recession
levels for sometime.

Some countries have instituted mandatory efficiency levels

for automobiles, the EPA fleet average requirements in the United States are one
example, or have gone to considerable lengths to obtain secure sources of liquids
fuels for domestic use, Brazil's alcohol fuel program and South Africa's coal li-
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quification plants are two other examples.

The argument that there exists an iron

tight linkage between gross domestic product (GDP) and energy demand seems to
have been discredited.

During the period 1961-1973, a time when real oil prices

were falling, the ratio of energy consumption to GDP rose every year in the in
dustrialized nations.

Since 1973 that ratio has been falling [36,p. 9].

A major por

tion of that decline has been due to reductions in industrial energy consumption.
While it is certain that the relationship between gross domestic product and
energy consumption is positive, its strength is uncertain. Thus an increase in GDP
will tend to cause an increase in energy demand, how much is a question that still
remains to be answered.

5.3. Forecasts
In addition to the previous general discussion of future oil price patterns,
there are several specific forecasts available.

In "World Economic Outlook", the

annual review of world economic developments prepared by the staff of the Inter
national Monetary Fund, the oil market "is expected to remain weak in" 1986 and
1987, leading to a projected price decline of "2 percent in 1985 and 3.5 percent in
1986" [21,pg.

152].

After about 1990, the report suggest a "greater possibility of

an increase in the real price of oil" [21,pg. 155]
The U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration forecasts
the price of oil yearly in "The Annual Energy Outlook".

As the forecasts in table

5 -3 show DOÊ/EIA is calling for an increase from the current price of $28.00 in
1984 to $40.00 (in 1984 dollars) by 1995 [8, pg. 219].

This is almost a 43 percent
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increase in the real price of oil. The last column shows the price of oil in nominal
dollars assuming a 4% rate of inflation.

T a b le 5 -3 :

YEAR

Petroleum P ric e Forecasts

OIL PRICE (1984 DOLLARS)

OIL PRICE

(DOLLARS PER BARREL)

(DOLLARS

1984

28.00

28.00

1985

28.00

29.00

1986

27.00

29.00

1987

27.00

30.00

1988

28.00

32.00

1989

29.00

34.00

1990

30.00

37.00

1995

40.00

60.00

SourcetU S. Department of Energy, EIA, "The Annual Energy Outlook"

Note: nominal price calculated by author assuming a 4% rate of inflation.
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5.4. Discussion
The effect of these multiple demand and supply considerations is to make it
difficult to accurately predict the price of oil. In the short run, it looks like the glut
of oil on the market will continue for sometime, thus holding down prices.

In the

long run, it seems, the price of oil can only go up. Barring an almost unimaginably
large discovery or a tremendous reduction in the demand for oil there seems no
other conclusion that can reasonably be reached.

The problem is one of deter

mining the eventual magnitude of that increase and its timing.
topics I intend to pursue.

These are not

There are a number of models developed by research

groups across the United States that attempt to forecast the oil market with vary
ing degrees of success.

My purpose here is to present the world oil situation, and

a discussion of the future with the implications for Montana resulting mostly from
changes in world wide supply and thus on price.

Chapter 6
Perspectives, Policy Implications and Further Research

The primary question throughout this paper, is how the government (i.e.
Montana) is to allocate non-renewable resources, using long range forecasting and
planning with albeit imperfect alternatives as well as attempting to account for risk
while still maximizing the present net value.

6.1. Perspectives
At the first level, there is a choice between centrally managed allocations
and market allocations.

Centrally managed allocations would not be acceptable to

a large number of people and thus are not a politically acceptable alternative in
this regard.

There was some discussion of risk allocation and whether the

government should be the ultimate risk bearer. The answer, on the basis of Pareto
optimality criteria, and market allocations under risk, is that the government as ul
timate risk bearer is inappropriate in this situation.
Chapter three introduced the concept of risk. It was mentioned that risk, the
probability that things may not turn out as planned, maybe due to either inherent
risk or to the decision maker's ignorance.

In either of these instances, the

decision-maker is faced with determining whether to live with the risk, to pay the
cost of reducing it, or to compensate someone else for bearing all or a portion it.
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It was also noted that risk is a real cost to decision making, and requires that real
resources be included in the cost analysis of various policy actions.

Thus, at a

societal level, the more risk averse its people are, the more costly to society risky
situations are.

The net result is that whether or not government takes on risky

projects, society through the individual bears the risk.

The market solution allows

the less risk adverse (i.e. risk takers) to specialize in risk taking.
It has been stated that in general with risk averse sellers and bidders, the
optimal bidding arrangement is a bonus bid for auction with a prespecified but ne
gotiable royalty.

The use of surface rents may have some value in preventing the

build up of inventories of un-drilled leases by raising the opportunity cost of hold
ing an undrilled lease, but this will tend to distort investment by firms in those
lease inventories unless the rent is kept to some "small" level.

If large numbers of

leases are being purchased and held as inventory, this suggests that the leasing
rate is too rapid.

Firms may perceive that it is in their best interest to purchase

leases at a lower rate now, anticipating that the price will increase to the point
that it pays to hold the leases as an investment.

In most cases, the bonus pay

ment will be large enough to encourage fairly rapid development, and coupled with
the uncertainty in the price of oil, will reduce the necessity for large surface rents
as a policy option.
Chapter four

developed

an

empirically

descriptive

model

that

can

be

employed to predict revenue from the lease auctions in the future given a number
of variables.

This is a tool that can be used to plan the timing of revenue from

those sales in such a fashion as to maximize the return to the state.

The coef
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ficient on the OPEC intervention variable indicates that the market responses in a
significant way to shocks, such as those produced by the oil embargo and sub
sequent price hikes.

While this type of market intervention is impossible to

forecast, it must be kept in mind that any future shocks are likely to also affect the
market in a similar fashion.
Chapter five discussed the future world oil situation with an eye toward the
effect supply and demand changes will have on the market in Montana.

6.2. Policy Implications
One of the main advantages of using bidding as an allocative device is that it
minimizes the amount of information the State (as seller) must have about a
specific tract to be leased.

There is a trade-off between risk and knowledge.

If

the rule of not accepting bids on tracts with less than four bidders is followed, as
well as other suggestions made previously, the only information the state needs is
economic information about the demand for lease tracts.

Hopefully, this paper will

make that type of analysis a little easier.
In general, the policy options presented throughout this discussion have
been fairly straight forward.

One can not, however make policy decisions on the

basis of economic analysis alone.

Some policy implications can be noted for firms

and consumers, as well as the government.
Since the level of information that the bidders have is so important the
government needs to insure that there is equal access to information by all inter
ested parties.

However, this is not to be construed as meaning that the State
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should disseminate information or that it should require that firms doing explora—
tion disseminate their information.

On the contrary, since much of the information

is gathered by firms that specialize only in gathering and interpreting that infor
mation, these types of requirements would have adverse economic impacts on
those very firms that are well qualified to gather such Information.

Anyone can

purchase that information from a firm that has done or will do the research and
processing necessary without requiring the bidder to acquire the equipment and
expertise to do the work himself.
Assuming these recommendations have been followed the "best" or optimal
procedure is to use a sealed discriminatory bid procedure; that is, bids are sub
mitted in sealed envelopes and the highest bid wins.

This serves as a precaution

against collusive behavior by the bidders, and prevents the free-rider problem
among bidders.

The amounts bid, but not the names of the unsuccessful bidders,

should be published after each auction as this will provide information about the
merits of various lease areas to other potential bidders. The requirement of sealed
bids will prevent the use of signals between competitors during bidding, and in
hibit collusion.
One of the striking results of this analysis Is that the government need not
engage in gathering information about specific tracts.

The only information that

the government needs is of an economic nature, as has been developed in this
paper.

It is certainly easier and cheaper to develop economic data than to gather

field data for all the tracts being offered at auction each year.
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6.3. Further Research
This study has pointed up several areas in which further research would be
useful.

The most significant is the whole question of lease timing.

As it stands

right now, the State of Montana has no way of controlling the timing of tract
leases.

It would be useful to examine how alternative timing schemes could have

altered the discounted net revenue to the state.

The model, developed in chapter

five, could be employed to examine the effects of alternative lease tract timing.
Another area of research that could be examined is the question of why some
tracts sell and others don't.

Using either discriminant analysis or logit/probit

analysis, the researcher could attempt to predict whether a particular tract would
sell or not, given certain conditions.
In conclusion, white no specific policy recommendations can be made, a
number of suggestions and their rationale have been.

It is hoped that the analysis

and suggestions presented in this paper will help to clarify the process of oil and
gas leasing and acquaint the reader with some of the issues and alternatives that
should be considered when discussing the policy options available.

Appendix A
Leasing Patterns

This appendix shows the changing lease patterns across the state during the
lease period 1971 - 1981.

There are three different approaches illustrated.

The

firs t in figure A -1 shows the acres of land being leased in each county as the
vertical axis.

The second, figure A-2, shows the price paid per acre in each

county, and the third, figure A -3 the total revenue from the sale of the leases in
that county.
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Figure A-1;

Lease Acres

TOTAL ACREAGE LEASED - 1971

m

BY COUNTY

TOTAL ACREAGE LEASED - 1981

BY COUNTY

107

Figure A-2:

Price Per Acre

a ver a g e price per a c r e

- 1971

BY COUNTY

a vera g e price per acre

-

BY COUNTY
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Figure A-3:

Total Lease Revenue

TOTAL REVENUE FROM LEASE AUCTION - 1971

BY COUNTY

TOTAL REVENUE FROM LEASE AUCTION - 1981

BY COUNTY
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